/*************************************************
*     Exim - an Internet mail transport agent    *
*************************************************/

/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2026 */
/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */

/* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */

#include "exim.h"

#ifndef MACRO_PREDEF

/* Default callout timeout */

#define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30

/* Default quota cache TTLs */

#define QUOTA_POS_DEFAULT (5*60)
#define QUOTA_NEG_DEFAULT (60*60)


/* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */

enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
       ACL_WARN };

/* ACL verbs */

static const uschar * verbs[] = {
    [ACL_ACCEPT] =	US"accept",
    [ACL_DEFER] =	US"defer",
    [ACL_DENY] =	US"deny",
    [ACL_DISCARD] =	US"discard",
    [ACL_DROP] =	US"drop",
    [ACL_REQUIRE] =	US"require",
    [ACL_WARN] =	US"warn"
};

/* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
"accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
the code. */

static int msgcond[] = {
  [ACL_ACCEPT] =	BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
  [ACL_DEFER] =		BIT(OK),
  [ACL_DENY] =		BIT(OK),
  [ACL_DISCARD] =	BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
  [ACL_DROP] =		BIT(OK),
  [ACL_REQUIRE] =	BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
  [ACL_WARN] =		BIT(OK)
  };

#endif

/* ACL condition and modifier codes */

enum { ACLC_ACL,
       ACLC_ADD_HEADER,
       ACLC_ATRN_DOMAINS,
       ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
       ACLC_CONDITION,
       ACLC_CONTINUE,
       ACLC_CONTROL,
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
       ACLC_DCC,
#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
       ACLC_DECODE,
#endif
       ACLC_DELAY,
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
       ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER,
       ACLC_DKIM_STATUS,
#endif
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_DMARC
       ACLC_DMARC_STATUS,
#endif
       ACLC_DNSLISTS,
       ACLC_DOMAINS,
       ACLC_ENCRYPTED,
       ACLC_ENDPASS,
       ACLC_HOSTS,
       ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS,
       ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE,
       ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
       ACLC_LOGWRITE,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
       ACLC_MALWARE,
#endif
       ACLC_MESSAGE,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
       ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
#endif
       ACLC_QUEUE,
       ACLC_RATELIMIT,
       ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
       ACLC_REGEX,
#endif
       ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER,
       ACLC_SEEN,
       ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS,
       ACLC_SENDERS,
       ACLC_SET,
       ACLC_SET_TAINTED,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
       ACLC_SPAM,
#endif
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SPF
       ACLC_SPF,
       ACLC_SPF_GUESS,
#endif
       ACLC_UDPSEND,
       ACLC_VERIFY,
};

/* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
"message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", "queue" and "set" are
modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
their side effects.  Do not invent new modifier names that result in one name
being the prefix of another; the binary-search in the list will go wrong. */

typedef struct condition_def {
  uschar	*name;

  /* Flags for actions or checks to do during readconf for this condition */
  unsigned	flags;
#define ACD_EXP		BIT(0)	/* do expansion at outer level*/
#define ACD_MOD		BIT(1)	/* is a modifier */
#define ACD_LOAD	BIT(2)	/* supported by a dynamic-load module */

  /* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
  times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
  For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
  times. */
  unsigned	forbids;
#define FORBIDDEN(times)	(times)
#define PERMITTED(times)	((unsigned) ~(times))

} condition_def;

static condition_def conditions[] = {
  [ACLC_ACL] =			{ US"acl",		0,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

  [ACLC_ADD_HEADER] =		{ US"add_header",	ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
				    ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
				    ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				    ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				    ACL_BIT_DKIM |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
  },

  [ACLC_ATRN_DOMAINS] =		{ US"atrn_domains",	ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_ATRN)
				},

  [ACLC_AUTHENTICATED] =	{ US"authenticated",	0,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
				    ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO),
  },
  [ACLC_CONDITION] =		{ US"condition",	ACD_EXP,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
  [ACLC_CONTINUE] =		{ US"continue",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

  /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
  always and check in the control processing itself. */
  [ACLC_CONTROL] =		{ US"control",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
  [ACLC_DCC] =			{ US"dcc",		ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
				  ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
  },
#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
  [ACLC_DECODE] =		{ US"decode",		ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MIME) },

#endif
  [ACLC_DELAY] =		{ US"delay",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT) },
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
  [ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER] =		{ US"dkim_signers",
# if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
				  ACD_LOAD |
# endif
				  ACD_EXP, 
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DKIM) },
  [ACLC_DKIM_STATUS] =		{ US"dkim_status",
# if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
				  ACD_LOAD |
# endif
				  ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DKIM | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_MIME
				  | ACL_BIT_PRDR
      ),
  },
#endif
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_DMARC
  [ACLC_DMARC_STATUS] =		{ US"dmarc_status",
# if EXIM_HAVE_DMARC==2
				  ACD_LOAD |
# endif
				  ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA) },
#endif

  /* Explicit key lookups can be made in non-smtp ACLs so pass
  always and check in the verify processing itself. */
  [ACLC_DNSLISTS] =		{ US"dnslists",		0,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

  [ACLC_DOMAINS] =		{ US"domains",		0,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
				  | ACL_BIT_PRDR
      ),
  },
  [ACLC_ENCRYPTED] =		{ US"encrypted",	0,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START | ACL_BIT_CONNECT)
  },

  [ACLC_ENDPASS] =		{ US"endpass",	ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

  [ACLC_HOSTS] =		{ US"hosts",		0,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
  },
  [ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS] =		{ US"local_parts",	0,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
				  | ACL_BIT_PRDR
      ),
  },

  [ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE] =		{ US"log_message",	ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
  [ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET] =	{ US"log_reject_target", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
  [ACLC_LOGWRITE] =		{ US"logwrite",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
  [ACLC_MALWARE] =		{ US"malware",		ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
				    ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
  },
#endif

  [ACLC_MESSAGE] =		{ US"message",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
  [ACLC_MIME_REGEX] =		{ US"mime_regex",	ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MIME) },
#endif

  [ACLC_QUEUE] =		{ US"queue",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				  ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				  ACL_BIT_DATA),
  },

  [ACLC_RATELIMIT] =		{ US"ratelimit",	ACD_EXP,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
  [ACLC_RECIPIENTS] =		{ US"recipients",	0,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_RCPT) },

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
  [ACLC_REGEX] =		{ US"regex",		ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
				    ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				    ACL_BIT_MIME),
  },

#endif
  [ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER] =	{ US"remove_header",	ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MAIL|ACL_BIT_RCPT |
				    ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
				    ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				    ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				    ACL_BIT_DKIM |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
  },
  [ACLC_SEEN] =			{ US"seen",		ACD_EXP,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
  [ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS] =	{ US"sender_domains",	0,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
				    ACL_BIT_HELO |
				    ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
				    ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
				    ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY),
  },
  [ACLC_SENDERS] =		{ US"senders",	0,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
				    ACL_BIT_HELO |
				    ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
				    ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
				    ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY),
  },

  [ACLC_SET] =			{ US"set",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
  [ACLC_SET_TAINTED] =		{ US"set_tainted",	ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
  [ACLC_SPAM] =			{ US"spam",		ACD_EXP,
				  PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
				  ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
  },
#endif
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SPF
  [ACLC_SPF] =			{ US"spf",
# if EXIM_HAVE_SPF==2
				  ACD_LOAD |
# endif
				  ACD_EXP,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
				    ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
				    ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
				    ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
  },
  [ACLC_SPF_GUESS] =		{ US"spf_guess",
# if EXIM_HAVE_SPF==2
				  ACD_LOAD |
# endif
				  ACD_EXP,
				  FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
				    ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
				    ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
				    ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
				    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
  },
#endif
  [ACLC_UDPSEND] =		{ US"udpsend",		ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },

  /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
  always and check in the verify function itself */
  [ACLC_VERIFY] =		{ US"verify",		ACD_EXP,
				  FORBIDDEN(0) },
};


#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF
# include "macro_predef.h"
void
features_acl(void)
{
for (condition_def * c = conditions; c < conditions + nelem(conditions); c++)
  {
  uschar buf[64], * p, * s;
  int n = snprintf(CS buf, sizeof(buf)-1,
		  "_ACL_%s_", c->flags & ACD_MOD ? "MOD" : "COND");
  for (p = buf + n, s = c->name; *s && p < buf + sizeof(buf)-1; s++)
    *p++ = toupper(*s);
  *p = '\0';
  builtin_macro_create(buf);
  }
}
#endif

/******************************************************************************/

#ifndef MACRO_PREDEF

/* These tables support loading of dynamic modules triggered by an ACL
condition use, spotted during readconf. See acl_read(). */

# ifdef LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR
typedef struct condition_module {
  const uschar *	mod_name;	/* module for the givien conditions */
  misc_module_info *	info;		/* NULL when not loaded */
  const int *		conditions;	/* array of ACLC_*, -1 terminated */
} condition_module;

#  if EXIM_HAVE_SPF==2
static int spf_condx[] = { ACLC_SPF, ACLC_SPF_GUESS, -1 };
#  endif
#  if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
static int dkim_condx[] = { ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER, ACLC_DKIM_STATUS, -1 };
#  endif
#  if EXIM_HAVE_DMARC==2
static int dmarc_condx[] = { ACLC_DMARC_STATUS, -1 };
#  endif

/* These are modules which can be loaded on seeing an ACL condition
during readconf, The "arc" module is handled by custom coding. */

static condition_module condition_modules[] = {
#  if EXIM_HAVE_SPF==2
  {.mod_name = US"spf", .conditions = spf_condx},
#  endif
#  if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
  {.mod_name = US"dkim", .conditions = dkim_condx},
#  endif
#  if EXIM_HAVE_DMARC==2
  {.mod_name = US"dmarc", .conditions = dmarc_condx},
#  endif
};

# endif	/*LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR*/

/****************************/

/* Return values from decode_control() */

enum {
  CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
  CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
  CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
  CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY,
  CONTROL_DEBUG,
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
  CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY,
#endif
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_DMARC
  CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY,
  CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC,
#endif
  CONTROL_DSCP,
  CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
  CONTROL_ERROR,		/* pseudo-value for decode errors */
  CONTROL_FAKEDEFER,
  CONTROL_FAKEREJECT,
  CONTROL_FREEZE,

  CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH,
  CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
  CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
  CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
#endif
  CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
  CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,

  CONTROL_QUEUE,
  CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
  CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
  CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT,
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
  CONTROL_WELLKNOWN,
#endif
};



/* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics.
For each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */

typedef struct control_def {
  uschar	*name;
  BOOL		has_option;     /* Has /option(s) following */
  unsigned	forbids;	/* bitmap of dis-allowed times */
} control_def;

static control_def controls_list[] = {
  /*	name			has_option	forbids */
[CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED] =
  { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", FALSE,
				  (unsigned)
				  ~(ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO)
  },
[CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART] =
  { US"caseful_local_part",      FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
[CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART] =
  { US"caselower_local_part",    FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
[CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY] =
  { US"cutthrough_delivery",     TRUE,		0 },
[CONTROL_DEBUG] =
  { US"debug",                   TRUE,		0 },

#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
[CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY] =
  { US"dkim_disable_verify",     FALSE,
				  ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
				  ACL_BIT_PRDR |
				  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },
#endif

#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_DMARC
[CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY] =
  { US"dmarc_disable_verify",    FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },
[CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC] =
  { US"dmarc_enable_forensic",   FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },
#endif

[CONTROL_DSCP] =
  { US"dscp",                    TRUE,
	  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START | ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT
  },
[CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
  { US"enforce_sync",            FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },

  /* Pseudo-value for decode errors */
[CONTROL_ERROR] =
  { US"error",                   FALSE, 0 },

[CONTROL_FAKEDEFER] =
  { US"fakedefer",               TRUE,
	  (unsigned)
	  ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
	    ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
	    ACL_BIT_PRDR |
	    ACL_BIT_MIME)
  },
[CONTROL_FAKEREJECT] =
  { US"fakereject",              TRUE,
	  (unsigned)
	  ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
	    ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
	  ACL_BIT_PRDR |
	  ACL_BIT_MIME)
  },
[CONTROL_FREEZE] =
  { US"freeze",                  TRUE,
	  (unsigned)
	  ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
	    ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
	    // ACL_BIT_PRDR|    /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
	    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
  },

[CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH] =
  { US"no_callout_flush",        FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },
[CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH] =
  { US"no_delay_flush",          FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },

[CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
  { US"no_enforce_sync",         FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
[CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL] =
  { US"no_mbox_unspool",         FALSE,
	(unsigned)
	~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
	  ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
	  // ACL_BIT_PRDR|    /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
	  ACL_BIT_MIME)
  },
#endif
[CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE] =
  { US"no_multiline_responses",  FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },
[CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING] =
  { US"no_pipelining",           FALSE,
	  ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
  },

[CONTROL_QUEUE] =
  { US"queue",			TRUE,
	  (unsigned)
	  ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
	    ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
	    // ACL_BIT_PRDR|    /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
	    ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
  },

[CONTROL_SUBMISSION] =
  { US"submission",              TRUE,
	  (unsigned)
	  ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA)
  },
[CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS] =
  { US"suppress_local_fixups",   FALSE,
    (unsigned)
    ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
      ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START)
  },
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
[CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT] =
  { US"utf8_downconvert",        TRUE, (unsigned) ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY)
  },
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
[CONTROL_WELLKNOWN] =
  { US"wellknown",               TRUE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_WELLKNOWN
  },
#endif
};

/* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
explanatory strings and verification return codes. */

static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;

enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };

/* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */

static int csa_return_code[] = {
  [CSA_UNKNOWN] =	OK,
  [CSA_OK] =		OK,
  [CSA_DEFER_SRV] =	OK,
  [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] =	OK,
  [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] =	FAIL,
  [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] =	FAIL,
  [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] =	FAIL,
  [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] =	FAIL
};

static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
  [CSA_UNKNOWN] =	US"unknown",
  [CSA_OK] =		US"ok",
  [CSA_DEFER_SRV] =	US"defer",
  [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] =	US"defer",
  [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] =	US"fail",
  [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] =	US"fail",
  [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] =	US"fail",
  [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] =	US"fail"
};

static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
  [CSA_UNKNOWN] =	US"unknown",
  [CSA_OK] =		US"ok",
  [CSA_DEFER_SRV] =	US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
  [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] =	US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
  [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] =	US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
  [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] =	US"failed (host name not authorized)",
  [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] =	US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
  [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] =	US"failed (client address mismatch)"
};

/* Options for the ratelimit condition. Note that there are two variants of
the per_rcpt option, depending on the ACL that is used to measure the rate.
However any ACL must be able to look up per_rcpt rates in /noupdate mode,
so the two variants must have the same internal representation as well as
the same configuration string. */

enum {
  RATE_PER_WHAT, RATE_PER_CLASH, RATE_PER_ADDR, RATE_PER_BYTE, RATE_PER_CMD,
  RATE_PER_CONN, RATE_PER_MAIL, RATE_PER_RCPT, RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS
};

#define RATE_SET(var,new) \
  (((var) == RATE_PER_WHAT) ? ((var) = RATE_##new) : ((var) = RATE_PER_CLASH))

static uschar *ratelimit_option_string[] = {
  [RATE_PER_WHAT] =	US"?",
  [RATE_PER_CLASH] =	US"!",
  [RATE_PER_ADDR] =	US"per_addr",
  [RATE_PER_BYTE] =	US"per_byte",
  [RATE_PER_CMD] =	US"per_cmd",
  [RATE_PER_CONN] =	US"per_conn",
  [RATE_PER_MAIL] =	US"per_mail",
  [RATE_PER_RCPT] =	US"per_rcpt",
  [RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS] =	US"per_rcpt"
};

/* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */

static int acl_check_wargs(int, address_item *, const uschar *, uschar **,
    uschar **);

static acl_block * acl_current = NULL;


/*************************************************
*            Find control in list                *
*************************************************/

/* The lists are always in order, so binary chop can be used.

Arguments:
  name      the control name to search for
  ol        the first entry in the control list
  last      one more than the offset of the last entry in the control list

Returns:    index of a control entry, or -1 if not found
*/

static int
find_control(const uschar * name, control_def * ol, int last)
{
for (int first = 0; last > first; )
  {
  int middle = (first + last)/2;
  const uschar * s =  ol[middle].name;
  int c = Ustrncmp(name, s, Ustrlen(s));
  if (c == 0) return middle;
  else if (c > 0) first = middle + 1;
  else last = middle;
  }
return -1;
}



/*************************************************
*         Pick out condition from list           *
*************************************************/

/* Use a binary chop method

Arguments:
  name        name to find
  list        list of conditions
  end         size of list

Returns:      offset in list, or -1 if not found
*/

static int
acl_findcondition(const uschar * name, const condition_def * list, int end)
{
for (int start = 0; start < end; )
  {
  int mid = (start + end)/2;
  int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid].name);
  if (c == 0) return mid;
  if (c < 0) end = mid;
  else start = mid + 1;
  }
return -1;
}


/*************************************************
*         Pick out name from list                *
*************************************************/

/* Use a binary chop method

Arguments:
  name        name to find
  list        list of names
  end         size of list

Returns:      offset in list, or -1 if not found
*/

static int
acl_checkname(const uschar * name, const uschar ** list, int end)
{
for (int start = 0; start < end; )
  {
  int mid = (start + end)/2;
  int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
  if (c == 0) return mid;
  if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
  }

return -1;
}


static BOOL
acl_varname_to_cond(const uschar ** sp, acl_condition_block * cond, uschar ** error)
{
const uschar * s = *sp, * endptr;

#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
if (  Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_status", 18) == 0
   || Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_reason", 18) == 0)
  {
  endptr = s+18;
  if (isalnum(*endptr))
    {
    *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
      "modifier \"set %s\" "
      "(only \"dkim_verify_status\" or \"dkim_verify_reason\" permitted)",
      s);
    return FALSE;
    }
  cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s, 18);
  }
else
#endif
  {
  if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 && Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
    {
    *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
      "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
    return FALSE;
    }

  endptr = s + 5;
  if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
    {
    *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
      "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
      s);
    return FALSE;
    }

  for ( ; *endptr && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr); endptr++)
    if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
      {
      *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
	"in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
      return FALSE;
      }

  cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
  }
s = endptr;
Uskip_whitespace(&s);
*sp = s;
return TRUE;
}


static BOOL
acl_data_to_cond(const uschar * s, acl_condition_block * cond,
  const uschar * name, uschar ** error)
{
if (*s++ != '=')
  {
  *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL %q %s", name,
    conditions[cond->type].flags & ACD_MOD ? US"modifier" : US"condition");
  return FALSE;
  }
Uskip_whitespace(&s);
cond->arg = string_copy(s);
return TRUE;
}


/*************************************************
*            Read and parse one ACL              *
*************************************************/

/* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
blank lines (where relevant).

Arguments:
  func        function to get next line of ACL
  error       where to put an error message

Returns:      pointer to ACL, or NULL
              NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
*/

acl_block *
acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
{
acl_block * yield = NULL, ** lastp = &yield, * this = NULL;
acl_condition_block * cond, ** condp = NULL;
const uschar * s;

*error = NULL;

while ((s = (*func)()))
  {
  int v, c;
  BOOL negated = FALSE;
  const uschar * saveline = s;
  uschar name[EXIM_DRIVERNAME_MAX];

  /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
  exclamation mark. */

  if (Uskip_whitespace(&s) == '!')
    {
    negated = TRUE;
    s++;
    }

  /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
  can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */

  s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
  if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;

  /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
  continues the previous verb. */

  if ((v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, nelem(verbs))) < 0)
    {
    if (!this)		/* not handling a verb right now */
      {
      *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb %q in %q", name, saveline);
      return NULL;
      }
    }

  /* New verb */

  else
    {
    if (negated)
      {
      *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line %q", saveline);
      return NULL;
      }
    *lastp = this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block), GET_UNTAINTED);
    lastp = &this->next;
    this->next = NULL;
    this->condition = NULL;
    this->verb = v;
    this->srcline = config_lineno;	/* for debug output */
    this->srcfile = config_filename;	/**/
    condp = &this->condition;
    if (!*s) continue;               /* No condition on this line */
    if (*s == '!')
      {
      negated = TRUE;
      s++;
      }
    s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);  /* Condition name */
    }

  /* Handle a condition or modifier. */

  if ((c = acl_findcondition(name, conditions, nelem(conditions))) < 0)
    {
    *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in %q", saveline);
    return NULL;
    }

  /* The modifiers may not be negated */

  if (negated && conditions[c].flags & ACD_MOD)
    {
    *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with %q",
			    conditions[c].name);
    return NULL;
    }

  /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */

  if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
      this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
      this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
    {
    *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: %q is not allowed with %q",
      conditions[c].name, verbs[this->verb]);
    return NULL;
    }

#ifdef LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR
  if (conditions[c].flags & ACD_LOAD)
    {				/* a loadable module supports this condition */
    condition_module * cm;
    uschar * t = NULL;

    /* Over the list of modules we support, check the list of ACL conditions
    each supports.  This assumes no duplicates. */

    for (cm = condition_modules;
        cm < condition_modules + nelem(condition_modules); cm++)
      for (const int * cond = cm->conditions; *cond != -1; cond++)
	if (*cond == c) goto found;
    found:

    if (cm >= condition_modules + nelem(condition_modules))
      {						/* shouldn't happen */
      *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: failed to locate support for '%s'",
			      conditions[c].name);
      return NULL;
      }
    if (  !cm->info				/* module not loaded */
       && !(cm->info = misc_mod_find(cm->mod_name, &t)))
      {
      *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: failed to find module for '%s': %s",
			      conditions[c].name, t);
      return NULL;
      }
    }
# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
  else if (c == ACLC_VERIFY)	/* Special handling for verify=arc; */
    {	/* not invented a more general method yet- flag in verify_type_list? */
    const uschar * t = s;
    uschar * e;
    if (  *t++ == '=' && Uskip_whitespace(&t) && Ustrncmp(t, "arc", 3) == 0
       && !misc_mod_find(US"arc", &e))
      {
      *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: failed to find module for '%s': %s",
			      conditions[c].name, e);
      return NULL;
      }
    }
# endif
#endif	/*LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR*/

  cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), GET_UNTAINTED);
  cond->next = NULL;
  cond->type = c;
  cond->u.negated = negated;

  *condp = cond;
  condp = &cond->next;

  /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
  rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
  gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
  variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
  extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
  arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
  After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
  after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
  compatibility. */

  if (c == ACLC_SET)
    if (!acl_varname_to_cond(&s, cond, error)) return NULL;

  /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
  "endpass" has no data */

  if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
    if (!acl_data_to_cond(s, cond, name, error)) return NULL;
  }

return yield;
}



/*************************************************
*         Set up added header line(s)            *
*************************************************/

/* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
"warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.

Argument:   string of header lines
Returns:    nothing
*/

static void
setup_header(const uschar *hstring)
{
const uschar *p, *q;
int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);

/* Ignore any leading newlines */
while (*hstring == '\n') hstring++, hlen--;

/* An empty string does nothing; ensure exactly one final newline. */
if (hlen <= 0) return;
if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n')		/* no newline */
  q = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n')	/* double newline */
  {
  uschar * s = string_copy(hstring);
  while(s[--hlen] == '\n')
    s[hlen+1] = '\0';
  q = s;
  }
else
  q = hstring;

/* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */

for (p = q; *p; p = q)
  {
  const uschar * s;
  uschar * hdr;
  int newtype = htype_add_bot;
  header_line ** hptr = &acl_added_headers;

  /* Find next header line within the string */

  for (;;)
    {
    q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');		/* we know there was a newline */
    if (*++q != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
    }

  /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
  add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */

  if (*p == ':')
    {
    if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
      {
      newtype = htype_add_rec;
      p += 16;
      }
    else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
      {
      newtype = htype_add_rfc;
      p += 14;
      }
    else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
      {
      newtype = htype_add_top;
      p += 10;
      }
    else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
      {
      newtype = htype_add_bot;
      p += 8;
      }
    while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
    }

  /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
  to the front of it. */

  for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
    if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;

  hdr = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", *s == ':' ? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", (int) (q - p), p);
  hlen = Ustrlen(hdr);

  /* See if this line has already been added */

  while (*hptr)
    {
    if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, hdr, hlen) == 0) break;
    hptr = &(*hptr)->next;
    }

  /* Add if not previously present */

  if (!*hptr)
    {
    /* The header_line struct itself is not tainted, though it points to
    possibly tainted data. */
    header_line * h = store_get(sizeof(header_line), GET_UNTAINTED);
    h->text = hdr;
    h->next = NULL;
    h->type = newtype;
    h->slen = hlen;
    *hptr = h;
    }
  }
}



/*************************************************
*        List the added header lines		 *
*************************************************/
uschar *
fn_hdrs_added(void)
{
gstring * g = NULL;

for (header_line * h = acl_added_headers; h; h = h->next)
  {
  int i = h->slen;
  if (h->text[i-1] == '\n') i--;
  g = string_append_listele_n(g, '\n', h->text, i);
  }

return string_from_gstring(g);
}


/*************************************************
*        Set up removed header line(s)           *
*************************************************/

/* This function is called by the remove_header modifier.  The argument is
treated as a sequence of header names which are added to a colon separated
list, provided there isn't an identical one already there.

Argument:   string of header names
Returns:    nothing
*/

static void
setup_remove_header(const uschar *hnames)
{
if (*hnames)
  acl_removed_headers = acl_removed_headers
    ? string_sprintf("%s : %s", acl_removed_headers, hnames)
    : string_copy(hnames);
}



/*************************************************
*               Handle warnings                  *
*************************************************/

/* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).

** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.

Arguments:
  where          ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
  user_message   message for adding to headers
  log_message    message for logging, if different

Returns:         nothing
*/

static void
acl_warn(int where, const uschar * user_message, const uschar * log_message)
{
if (log_message && log_message != user_message)
  {
  uschar *text;
  string_item *logged;

  text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s",  host_and_ident(TRUE),
    string_printing(log_message));

  /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
  failed", add the failure message. */

  if (  sender_verified_failed
     && sender_verified_failed->message
     && strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
    text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);

  /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
  store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */

  for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged; logged = logged->next)
    if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;

  if (!logged)
    {
    int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
    log_write(LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
    logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
    logged->text = US logged + sizeof(string_item);
    memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
    logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
    acl_warn_logged = logged;
    }
  }

/* If there's no user message, we are done. */

if (!user_message) return;

/* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
Log an error. */

if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
  {
  log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
    "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
    "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
  return;
  }

/* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */

setup_header(user_message);
}



/*************************************************
*         Verify and check reverse DNS           *
*************************************************/

/* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.

Arguments:
  user_msgptr  pointer for user message
  log_msgptr   pointer for log message

Returns:       OK        verification condition succeeded
               FAIL      verification failed
               DEFER     there was a problem verifying
*/

static int
acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
{
int rc;

/* Previous success */

if (sender_host_name) return OK;

/* Previous failure */

if (host_lookup_failed)
  {
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
  return FAIL;
  }

/* Need to do a lookup */

HDEBUG(acl)
  debug_printf_indent("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");

if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
  {
  *log_msgptr = rc == DEFER
    ? US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
    : string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
	host_lookup_msg);
  return rc;    /* DEFER or FAIL */
  }

host_build_sender_fullhost();
return OK;
}



/*************************************************
*   Check client IP address matches CSA target   *
*************************************************/

/* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)

Arguments:
  dnsa       the DNS answer block
  dnss       a DNS scan block for us to use
  reset      option specifying what portion to scan, as described above
  target     the target hostname to use for matching RR names

Returns:     CSA_OK             successfully authorized
             CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH  addresses found but none matched
             CSA_FAIL_NOADDR    no target addresses found
*/

static int
acl_verify_csa_address(const dns_answer * dnsa, dns_scan * dnss, int reset,
                       const uschar * target)
{
int rc = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;

for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
     rr;
     rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
  {
  /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */

  if (rr->type != T_A
    #if HAVE_IPV6
      && rr->type != T_AAAA
    #endif
  ) continue;

  if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;

  rc = CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;

  /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
  the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */

  for (dns_address * da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da; da = da->next)
    {
    /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */

    DEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);

    if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
    }
  }

/* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
addresses. */

return rc;
}



/*************************************************
*       Verify Client SMTP Authorization         *
*************************************************/

/* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
$sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.

Arguments:
  domain    pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa

Returns:    CSA_UNKNOWN    no valid CSA record found
            CSA_OK         successfully authorized
            CSA_FAIL_*     client is definitely not authorized
            CSA_DEFER_*    there was a DNS problem
*/

static int
acl_verify_csa(const uschar *domain)
{
tree_node *t;
const uschar *found;
int priority, weight, port;
dns_answer * dnsa;
dns_scan dnss = {0};
dns_record *rr;
int rc, type, yield;
#define TARGET_SIZE 256
uschar * target = store_get(TARGET_SIZE, GET_TAINTED);

/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */

while (isspace(*domain) && *domain) ++domain;
if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
if (!domain) domain = sender_host_address;
if (!sender_host_address) return CSA_UNKNOWN;

/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */

if (domain[0] == '[')
  {
  const uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
  if (start == NULL) start = domain;
  domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
  }

/* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */

if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
  {
  if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
  domain = dns_build_reverse(domain);
  }

/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
we return from this function. */

if ((t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain)))
  return t->data.val;

t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain), domain);
Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);

/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */

found = domain;
dnsa = store_get_dns_answer();
switch (dns_special_lookup(dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
  {
  /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */

  default:
    yield = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
    goto out;

  /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */

  case DNS_NOMATCH:
  case DNS_NODATA:
    yield = CSA_UNKNOWN;
    goto out;

  /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */

  case DNS_SUCCEED:
    break;
  }

/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */

for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
     rr;
     rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)) if (rr->type == T_SRV)
  {
  const uschar * p = rr->data;

  /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */

  if (rr_bad_size(rr, 3 * sizeof(uint16_t))) continue;
  GETSHORT(priority, p);
  GETSHORT(weight, p);
  GETSHORT(port, p);

  DEBUG(acl)
    debug_printf_indent("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);

  /* Check the CSA version number */

  if (priority != 1) continue;

  /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
  found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
  the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
  assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
  SRV records of their own. */

  if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
    {
    yield = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN;
    goto out;
    }

  /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
  in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
  unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
  address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
  greater than 3 are undefined. */

  if (weight < 2)
    {
    yield = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
    goto out;
    }

  if (weight > 2) continue;

  /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
  client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
  target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */

  (void)dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, p,
    (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, TARGET_SIZE);

  DEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target is %s\n", target);

  break;
  }

/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */

if (!rr)
  {
  yield = CSA_UNKNOWN;
  goto out;
  }

/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */

if (!*target)
  {
  yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
  goto out;
  }

/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */

rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR)
  {
  yield = rc;
  goto out;
  }

/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */

#if HAVE_IPV6
if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
  type = T_AAAA;
else
#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
  type = T_A;


lookup_dnssec_authenticated = NULL;
switch (dns_lookup(dnsa, target, type, NULL))
  {
  /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */

  default:
    yield = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
    break;

  /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */

  case DNS_SUCCEED:
    rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
    if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR)
      {
      yield = rc;
      break;
      }
    /* else fall through */

  /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
  IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
  we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */

  case DNS_NOMATCH:
  case DNS_NODATA:
    yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
    break;
  }

out:

store_free_dns_answer(dnsa);
return t->data.val = yield;
}



/*************************************************
*     Handle verification (address & other)      *
*************************************************/

enum { VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, VERIFY_CERT, VERIFY_HELO, VERIFY_CSA, VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX,
       VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT,
       VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, VERIFY_ARC
  };
typedef struct {
  uschar * name;
  int	   value;
  unsigned where_allowed;	/* bitmap */
  BOOL	   no_options;		/* Never has /option(s) following */
  unsigned alt_opt_sep;		/* >0 Non-/ option separator (custom parser) */
  } verify_type_t;
static verify_type_t verify_type_list[] = {
    /*	name			value			where	        no-opt opt-sep */
    { US"reverse_host_lookup",	VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP,	(unsigned)~0,	FALSE, 0 },
    { US"certificate",	  	VERIFY_CERT,	 	(unsigned)~0,	TRUE,  0 },
    { US"helo",	  		VERIFY_HELO,	 	(unsigned)~0,	TRUE,  0 },
    { US"csa",	  		VERIFY_CSA,	 	(unsigned)~0,	FALSE, 0 },
    { US"header_syntax",	VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX,	ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, TRUE, 0 },
    { US"not_blind",	  	VERIFY_NOT_BLIND,	ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, FALSE, 0 },
    { US"header_sender",	VERIFY_HDR_SNDR,	ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, FALSE, 0 },
    { US"sender",	  	VERIFY_SNDR,		ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT
			| ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP,
										FALSE, 6 },
    { US"recipient",	  	VERIFY_RCPT,	 	ACL_BIT_RCPT,	FALSE, 0 },
    { US"header_names_ascii",	VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, TRUE, 0 },
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
    { US"arc",			VERIFY_ARC,	 	ACL_BIT_DATA,	FALSE , 0 },
#endif
  };


enum { CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, CALLOUT_NOCACHE, CALLOUT_RANDOM, CALLOUT_USE_SENDER,
  CALLOUT_USE_TPTSENDER, CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER,
  CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER, CALLOUT_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM,
  CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, CALLOUT_CONNECT, CALLOUT_HOLD,
  CALLOUT_TIME	/* TIME must be last */
  };
typedef struct {
  uschar * name;
  int      value;
  int	   flag;
  BOOL     has_option;	/* Has =option(s) following */
  BOOL     timeval;	/* Has a time value */
  } callout_opt_t;
static callout_opt_t callout_opt_list[] = {
    /*	name			value			flag		has-opt		has-time */
    { US"defer_ok",   	  CALLOUT_DEFER_OK,	 0,				FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"no_cache",   	  CALLOUT_NOCACHE,	 vopt_callout_no_cache,		FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"random",	  CALLOUT_RANDOM,	 vopt_callout_random,		FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"use_sender",     CALLOUT_USE_SENDER,	 vopt_callout_recipsender,	FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"use_tptsender",  CALLOUT_USE_TPTSENDER, vopt_callout_r_tptsender,	FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"use_postmaster", CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER,vopt_callout_r_pmaster,	FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"postmaster_mailfrom",CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM,0,			TRUE,  FALSE },
    { US"postmaster",	  CALLOUT_POSTMASTER,	 0,				FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"fullpostmaster", CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,vopt_callout_fullpm,		FALSE, FALSE },
    { US"mailfrom",	  CALLOUT_MAILFROM,	 0,				TRUE,  FALSE },
    { US"maxwait",	  CALLOUT_MAXWAIT,	 0,				TRUE,  TRUE },
    { US"connect",	  CALLOUT_CONNECT,	 0,				TRUE,  TRUE },
    { US"hold",		  CALLOUT_HOLD,		 vopt_callout_hold,		FALSE, FALSE },
    { NULL,		  CALLOUT_TIME,		 0,				FALSE, TRUE }
  };



static int
v_period(const uschar * s, const uschar * arg, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
int period;
if ((period = readconf_readtime(s, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
  {
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
    "\"verify %s\"", arg);
  }
return period;
}



static BOOL
sender_helo_verified_internal(void)
{
/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */

if (!f.helo_verified && !f.helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
return f.helo_verified;
}

static int
sender_helo_verified_cond(void)
{
return sender_helo_verified_internal() ? OK : FAIL;
}

uschar *
sender_helo_verified_boolstr(void)
{
return sender_helo_verified_internal() ? US"yes" : US"no";
}



/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.

Arguments:
  where        where called from
  addr         the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
  arg          the argument of "verify"
  user_msgptr  pointer for user message
  log_msgptr   pointer for log message
  basic_errno  where to put verify errno

Returns:       OK        verification condition succeeded
               FAIL      verification failed
               DEFER     there was a problem verifying
               ERROR     syntax error
*/

static int
acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *arg,
  uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
{
int sep = '/', callout = -1, callout_overall = -1, callout_connect = -1;
int verify_options = 0, rc;
BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE, defer_ok = FALSE, callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
BOOL no_details = FALSE, success_on_redirect = FALSE, quota = FALSE;
int quota_pos_cache = QUOTA_POS_DEFAULT, quota_neg_cache = QUOTA_NEG_DEFAULT;
address_item * sender_vaddr = NULL;
const uschar * verify_sender_address = NULL;
uschar * pm_mailfrom = NULL, * se_mailfrom = NULL;

/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
an error if options are given for items that don't expect them.
*/

uschar * slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
const uschar * list = arg;
uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
verify_type_t * vp;

acl_level++;
if (!ss) goto BAD_VERIFY;

/* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */

for (vp = verify_type_list;
     CS vp < CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list);
     vp++
    )
  if (vp->alt_opt_sep ? strncmpic(ss, vp->name, vp->alt_opt_sep) == 0
                      : strcmpic (ss, vp->name) == 0)
   break;
if (CS vp >= CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list))
  goto BAD_VERIFY;

if (vp->no_options && slash)
  {
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in %q "
    "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
  rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
  }
if (!(vp->where_allowed & BIT(where)))
  {
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify %s in ACL for %s",
		  vp->name, acl_wherenames[where]);
  rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
  }
switch(vp->value)
  {
  case VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP:
    if (!sender_host_address) { rc = OK; goto OUT; }
    if ((rc = acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr)) == DEFER)
      while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
	if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0)
	  { rc = OK; goto OUT; }
    goto OUT;

  case VERIFY_CERT:
    /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
    test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
    mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */

    if (tls_in.certificate_verified) { rc = OK; goto OUT; }
    *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
    rc = FAIL;
    goto OUT;

  case VERIFY_HELO:
    rc = sender_helo_verified_cond();
    goto OUT;

  case VERIFY_CSA:
    /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
    result code into user-friendly strings. */

    rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
    *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
                                              csa_reason_string[rc]);
    csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
    DEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
    rc = csa_return_code[rc];
    goto OUT;

#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
  case VERIFY_ARC:
    {
    const misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_findonly(US"arc");
    typedef int (*fn_t)(const uschar *);
    rc = mi ? (((fn_t *) mi->functions)[ARC_VERIFY])
				(CUS string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0))
	    : DEFER;
    goto OUT;
    }
#endif

  case VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX:
    /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct 5322-syntax. If there is
    a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
    send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
    always). */

    rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
    if (rc != OK && *log_msgptr)
      if (smtp_return_error_details)
	*user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
      else
	acl_verify_message = *log_msgptr;
    goto OUT;

  case VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII:
    /* Check that all header names are true 7 bit strings
    See RFC 5322, 2.2. and RFC 6532, 3. */

    rc = verify_check_header_names_ascii(log_msgptr);
    if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr)
      *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
    goto OUT;

  case VERIFY_NOT_BLIND:
    /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
    recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
    {
    BOOL case_sensitive = TRUE;

    while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
      if (strcmpic(ss, US"case_insensitive") == 0)
        case_sensitive = FALSE;
      else
        {
        *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option %q in ACL "
           "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
        rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
        }

    if ((rc = verify_check_notblind(case_sensitive)) != OK)
      {
      *log_msgptr = US"bcc recipient detected";
      if (smtp_return_error_details)
        *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
      }
    goto OUT;
    }

  /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
  either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
  slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */

  case VERIFY_HDR_SNDR:
    verify_header_sender = TRUE;
    break;

  case VERIFY_SNDR:
    /* In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
    in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
    {
    uschar *s = ss + 6;
    if (!*s)
      verify_sender_address = sender_address;
    else
      {
      if (Uskip_whitespace(&s) != '=')
	goto BAD_VERIFY;
      s++;
      Uskip_whitespace(&s);
      verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
      }
    }
    break;

  case VERIFY_RCPT:
    break;
  }



/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
verification, including "header sender" verification. */

while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
  {
  if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;

  /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */

  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
    {
    callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
    if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
    }

  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
     {
     pm_mailfrom = US"";
     if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
     }

  /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */

  else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
    {
    callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
    if (*(ss += 7))
      {
      Uskip_whitespace(&ss);
      if (*ss++ == '=')
        {
	const uschar * sublist = ss;
        int optsep = ',';

	Uskip_whitespace(&sublist);
        for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, NULL, 0); )
          {
	  callout_opt_t * op;
	  double period = 1.0F;

	  for (op= callout_opt_list; op->name; op++)
	    if (strncmpic(opt, op->name, Ustrlen(op->name)) == 0)
	      break;

	  verify_options |= op->flag;
	  if (op->has_option)
	    {
	    opt += Ustrlen(op->name);
            Uskip_whitespace(&opt);
            if (*opt++ != '=')
              {
              *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
                "%q in ACL verify condition %q", op->name, arg);
              rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
              }
            Uskip_whitespace(&opt);
	    }
	  if (op->timeval && (period = v_period(opt, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
	    { rc = ERROR; goto OUT; }

	  switch(op->value)
	    {
            case CALLOUT_DEFER_OK:		callout_defer_ok = TRUE; break;
            case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER:		pm_mailfrom = US"";	break;
            case CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER:	pm_mailfrom = US"";	break;
            case CALLOUT_MAILFROM:
              if (!verify_header_sender)
                {
                *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
                  "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
                  "condition %q)", arg);
                rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
                }
              se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
  	      break;
            case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM:	pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); break;
            case CALLOUT_MAXWAIT:		callout_overall = period;	break;
            case CALLOUT_CONNECT:		callout_connect = period;	break;
            case CALLOUT_TIME:			callout = period;		break;
	    }
          }
        }
      else
        {
        *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
          "ACL condition %q", arg);
        rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
        }
      }
    }

  /* The quota option has sub-options, comma-separated */

  else if (strncmpic(ss, US"quota", 5) == 0)
    {
    quota = TRUE;
    if (*(ss += 5))
      {
      Uskip_whitespace(&ss);
      if (*ss++ == '=')
        {
	const uschar * sublist = ss;
        int optsep = ',';
	int period;

        Uskip_whitespace(&sublist);
        for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, NULL, 0); )
	  if (Ustrncmp(opt, "cachepos=", 9) == 0)
	    if ((period = v_period(opt += 9, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
	      { rc = ERROR; goto OUT; }
	    else
	      quota_pos_cache = period;
	  else if (Ustrncmp(opt, "cacheneg=", 9) == 0)
	    if ((period = v_period(opt += 9, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
	      { rc = ERROR; goto OUT; }
	    else
	      quota_neg_cache = period;
	  else if (Ustrcmp(opt, "no_cache") == 0)
	    quota_pos_cache = quota_neg_cache = 0;
	}
      }
    }

  /* Option not recognized */

  else
    {
    *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option %q in ACL "
      "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
    rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
    }
  }

 {
  int ropts = verify_options &
    (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_r_tptsender|vopt_callout_r_pmaster);
  if (ropts && verify_sender_address)
    {
    *log_msgptr = US"use_sender, use_tptsender or use_postmaster cannot be used"
      "for a sender verify callout";
    rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
    }
  if ((ropts-1) & -ropts)		/* more than one bit set */
    {
    *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender, use_tptsender and use_postmaster"
      " can be set for a recipient callout";
    rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
    }
 }

/* Handle quota verification */
if (quota)
  {
  if (vp->value != VERIFY_RCPT)
    {
    *log_msgptr = US"can only verify quota of recipient";
    rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
    }

  if ((rc = verify_quota_call(addr->address,
	      quota_pos_cache, quota_neg_cache, log_msgptr)) != OK)
    {
    *basic_errno = errno;
    if (smtp_return_error_details)
      {
      if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
        *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after %s: %s",
	    smtp_names[smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index)]],
	    *log_msgptr);
      if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
      }
    }

  goto OUT;
  }

/* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
message if giving out verification details. */

if (verify_header_sender)
  {
  int verrno;

  if ((rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
    callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
    &verrno)) != OK)
    {
    *basic_errno = verrno;
    if (smtp_return_error_details)
      {
      if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
        *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
      if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
      }
    }
  }

/* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
during message reception.

A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */

else if (verify_sender_address)
  {
  sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
  if (   sender_vaddr				/* Previously checked */
      && callout <= 0)				/* No callout needed this time */
    {
    /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
    this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
    callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
    must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */

    if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed))
      rc = OK;
    else
      {
      rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
      *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
      }
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("using cached sender verify result\n");
    }

  /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
  verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
  specified (see comments above).

  The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
  RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
  the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
  been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
  more in esoteric circumstances. */

  else
    {
    BOOL routed = TRUE;
    uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;

    sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
    if ((sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
      {
      sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt =       message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
      sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
      }
#endif
    if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
    if (*verify_sender_address)
      {
      /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
      for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
      sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */

      if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
        sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
      else
        verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;

      if (success_on_redirect)
        verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;

      /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
      verify_options. */

      rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, -1, verify_options, callout,
        callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);

      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");

      if (rc != OK)
        *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
      else
	DEBUG(acl)
	  if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
	    debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
	      verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
	  else
	    debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok\n",
	      verify_sender_address);
      }
    else
      {
      DEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent(" null sender\n");
      rc = OK;
      }

    /* Cache the result code */

    if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
    if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
    sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
    sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
    sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;

    /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
    the sender verification. */

    deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
    }

  /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */

  sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->prop.address_data;
  }

/* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
the DEFER overrides. */

else
  {
  address_item addr2;

  if (success_on_redirect)
    verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;

  /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
  get rewritten. */

  addr2 = *addr;
  rc = verify_address(&addr2, -1, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
    callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");

  *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
  *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
  *user_msgptr = addr2.user_message ? addr2.user_message : addr2.message;

  /* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
  if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;

  /* Make $address_data visible */
  deliver_address_data = addr2.prop.address_data;
  }

/* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */

if (  rc == DEFER
   && (  defer_ok
      || callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
   )  )
  {
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
    defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
  rc = OK;
  }

/* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */

if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address)
  {
  if (rc != DEFER)
    *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
  else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
    *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
  else
    {
    *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
    *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
      *log_msgptr;
    }

  sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
  }

/* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */

if (addr)
  {
  deliver_domain = addr->domain;
  deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
  }

OUT:
  acl_level--;
  return rc;

/* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */

BAD_VERIFY:
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
    "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\", \"header_names_ascii\" "
    "or \"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
    "\"verify %s\"", arg);
  rc = ERROR; goto OUT;
}




/*************************************************
*        Check argument for control= modifier    *
*************************************************/

/* Called from acl_check_condition() below.
To handle the case "queue_only" we accept an _ in the
initial / option-switch position.

Arguments:
  arg         the argument string for control=
  pptr        set to point to the terminating character
  where       which ACL we are in
  log_msgptr  for error messages

Returns:      CONTROL_xxx value
*/

static int
decode_control(const uschar *arg, const uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
{
int idx, len;
const control_def * d;
uschar c;

if (  (idx = find_control(arg, controls_list, nelem(controls_list))) < 0
   || (  (c = arg[len = Ustrlen((d = controls_list+idx)->name)]) != 0
      && (!d->has_option || c != '/' && c != '_')
   )  )
  {
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
  return CONTROL_ERROR;
  }

*pptr = arg + len;
return idx;
}




/*************************************************
*        Return a ratelimit error                *
*************************************************/

/* Called from acl_ratelimit() below

Arguments:
  log_msgptr  for error messages
  format      format string
  ...         supplementary arguments

Returns:      ERROR
*/

static int
ratelimit_error(uschar **log_msgptr, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list ap;
gstring * g =
  string_cat(NULL, US"error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: ");

va_start(ap, format);
g = string_vformat(g, SVFMT_EXTEND|SVFMT_REBUFFER, format, ap);
va_end(ap);

gstring_release_unused(g);
*log_msgptr = string_from_gstring(g);
return ERROR;
}




/*************************************************
*            Handle rate limiting                *
*************************************************/

/* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
of the ACL ratelimit condition.

Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h

Arguments:
  arg         the option string for ratelimit=
  where       ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
  log_msgptr  for error messages

Returns:       OK        - Sender's rate is above limit
               FAIL      - Sender's rate is below limit
               DEFER     - Problem opening ratelimit database
               ERROR     - Syntax error in options.
*/

static int
acl_ratelimit(const uschar * arg, int where, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
double limit, period, count;
uschar * ss, * key = NULL, * unique = NULL;
int sep = '/', mode = RATE_PER_WHAT, old_pool, rc;
BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, readonly = FALSE;
BOOL noupdate = FALSE, badacl = FALSE;
tree_node ** anchor = NULL, * t;
open_db dbblock, * dbm;
int dbdb_size;
dbdata_ratelimit * dbd;
dbdata_ratelimit_unique * dbdb;
struct timeval tv;

/* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */

/* First is the maximum number of messages per period / maximum burst
size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */

if (!(sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
  return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "sender rate limit not set");

limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
if      (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }

if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
  return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
    "%q is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);

/* Second is the rate measurement period / exponential smoothing time
constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
run-time division errors. */

period = !(sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0))
  ? -1.0 : readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
if (period <= 0.0)
  return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
    "%q is not a time value", sender_rate_period);

/* By default we are counting one of something, but the per_rcpt,
per_byte, and count options can change this. */

count = 1.0;

/* Parse the other options. */

while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
  {
  if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"readonly") == 0) readonly = TRUE;
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) RATE_SET(mode, PER_CMD);
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0)
    {
    RATE_SET(mode, PER_CONN);
    if (where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
      badacl = TRUE;
    }
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0)
    {
    RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
    if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
    }
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0)
    {
    /* If we are running in the RCPT ACL, then we'll count the recipients
    one by one, but if we are running when we have accumulated the whole
    list then we'll add them all in one batch. */
    if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
      RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
    else if (where >= ACL_WHERE_PREDATA && where <= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
      RATE_SET(mode, PER_ALLRCPTS), count = (double)recipients_count;
    else if (where == ACL_WHERE_MAIL || where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
      RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT), badacl = TRUE;
    }
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0)
    {
    /* If we have not yet received the message data and there was no SIZE
    declaration on the MAIL command, then it's safe to just use a value of
    zero and let the recorded rate decay as if nothing happened. */
    RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
    if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
    else count = message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size;
    }
  else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_addr") == 0)
    {
    RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
    if (where != ACL_WHERE_RCPT) badacl = TRUE, unique = US"*";
    else unique = string_sprintf("%s@%s", deliver_localpart, deliver_domain);
    }
  else if (strncmpic(ss, US"count=", 6) == 0)
    {
    uschar *e;
    count = Ustrtod(ss+6, &e);
    if (count < 0.0 || *e != '\0')
      return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "%q is not a positive number", ss);
    }
  else if (strncmpic(ss, US"unique=", 7) == 0)
    unique = string_copy(ss + 7);
  else if (!key)
    key = string_copy(ss);
  else
    key = string_sprintf("%s/%s", key, ss);
  }

/* Sanity check. When the badacl flag is set the update mode must either
be readonly (which is the default if it is omitted) or, for backwards
compatibility, a combination of noupdate and strict or leaky. */

if (mode == RATE_PER_CLASH)
  return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting per_* options");
if (leaky + strict + readonly > 1)
  return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting update modes");
if (badacl && (leaky || strict) && !noupdate)
  return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
    "%q must not have /leaky or /strict option, or cannot be used in %s ACL",
    ratelimit_option_string[mode], acl_wherenames[where]);

/* Set the default values of any unset options. In readonly mode we
perform the rate computation without any increment so that its value
decays to eventually allow over-limit senders through. */

if (noupdate) readonly = TRUE, leaky = strict = FALSE;
if (badacl) readonly = TRUE;
if (readonly) count = 0.0;
if (!strict && !readonly) leaky = TRUE;
if (mode == RATE_PER_WHAT) mode = RATE_PER_MAIL;

/* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */

if (!key)
  key = !sender_host_address ? US"" : sender_host_address;

key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s%s",
  sender_rate_period,
  ratelimit_option_string[mode],
  unique == NULL ? "" : "unique/",
  key);

HDEBUG(acl)
  debug_printf_indent("ratelimit condition count=%.0f %.1f/%s\n", count, limit, key);

/* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
pool so that they survive across resets. In readonly mode we only remember the
result for the rest of this command in case a later command changes it. After
this bit of logic the code is independent of the per_* mode. */

old_pool = store_pool;

if (readonly)
  anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
else switch(mode)
  {
  case RATE_PER_CONN:
    anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
    store_pool = POOL_PERM;
    break;
  case RATE_PER_BYTE:
  case RATE_PER_MAIL:
  case RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS:
    anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
    break;
  case RATE_PER_ADDR:
  case RATE_PER_CMD:
  case RATE_PER_RCPT:
    anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
    break;
  default:
    log_write_die(LOG_MAIN,
      "internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
    /*NOTREACHED*/
    break;
  }

if ((t = tree_search(*anchor, key)))
  {
  dbd = t->data.ptr;
  /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
  rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
  store_pool = old_pool;
  sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
  HDEBUG(acl)
    debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
  return rc;
  }

/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */

if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR|O_CREAT, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
  {
  store_pool = old_pool;
  sender_rate = NULL;
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit database not available\n");
  *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
  return DEFER;
  }
dbdb = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, &dbdb_size);
dbd = NULL;

gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);

if (dbdb)
  {
  /* Locate the basic ratelimit block inside the DB data. */
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found key in database\n");
  dbd = &dbdb->dbd;

  /* Forget the old Bloom filter if it is too old, so that we count each
  repeating event once per period. We don't simply clear and re-use the old
  filter because we want its size to change if the limit changes. Note that
  we keep the dbd pointer for copying the rate into the new data block. */

  if(unique && tv.tv_sec > dbdb->bloom_epoch + period)
    {
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding old Bloom filter\n");
    dbdb = NULL;
    }

  /* Sanity check. */

  if(unique && dbdb_size < sizeof(*dbdb))
    {
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding undersize Bloom filter\n");
    dbdb = NULL;
    }
  }

/* Allocate a new data block if the database lookup failed
or the Bloom filter passed its age limit. */

if (!dbdb)
  {
  if (!unique)
    {
    /* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
    dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
    dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, GET_UNTAINTED);
    }
  else
    {
    int extra;
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new Bloom filter\n");

    /* See the long comment below for an explanation of the magic number 2.
    The filter has a minimum size in case the rate limit is very small;
    this is determined by the definition of dbdata_ratelimit_unique. */

    extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
    if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
    dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
    dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, GET_UNTAINTED);
    dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
    dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
    memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);

    /* Preserve any basic ratelimit data (which is our longer-term memory)
    by copying it from the discarded block. */

    if (dbd)
      {
      dbdb->dbd = *dbd;
      dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
      }
    }
  }

/* If we are counting unique events, find out if this event is new or not.
If the client repeats the event during the current period then it should be
counted. We skip this code in readonly mode for efficiency, because any
changes to the filter will be discarded and because count is already set to
zero. */

if (unique && !readonly)
  {
  /* We identify unique events using a Bloom filter. (You can find my
  notes on Bloom filters at http://fanf.livejournal.com/81696.html)
  With the per_addr option, an "event" is a recipient address, though the
  user can use the unique option to define their own events. We only count
  an event if we have not seen it before.

  We size the filter according to the rate limit, which (in leaky mode)
  is the limit on the population of the filter. We allow 16 bits of space
  per entry (see the construction code above) and we set (up to) 8 of them
  when inserting an element (see the loop below). The probability of a false
  positive (an event we have not seen before but which we fail to count) is

    size    = limit * 16
    numhash = 8
    allzero = exp(-numhash * pop / size)
            = exp(-0.5 * pop / limit)
    fpr     = pow(1 - allzero, numhash)

  For senders at the limit the fpr is      0.06%    or  1 in 1700
  and for senders at half the limit it is  0.0006%  or  1 in 170000

  In strict mode the Bloom filter can fill up beyond the normal limit, in
  which case the false positive rate will rise. This means that the
  measured rate for very fast senders can bogusly drop off after a while.

  At twice the limit, the fpr is  2.5%  or  1 in 40
  At four times the limit, it is  31%   or  1 in 3.2

  It takes ln(pop/limit) periods for an over-limit burst of pop events to
  decay below the limit, and if this is more than one then the Bloom filter
  will be discarded before the decay gets that far. The false positive rate
  at this threshold is 9.3% or 1 in 10.7. */

  BOOL seen;
  unsigned n, hash, hinc;
  uschar md5sum[16];
  md5 md5info;

  /* Instead of using eight independent hash values, we combine two values
  using the formula h1 + n * h2. This does not harm the Bloom filter's
  performance, and means the amount of hash we need is independent of the
  number of bits we set in the filter. */

  md5_start(&md5info);
  md5_end(&md5info, unique, Ustrlen(unique), md5sum);
  hash = md5sum[0] | md5sum[1] << 8 | md5sum[2] << 16 | md5sum[3] << 24;
  hinc = md5sum[4] | md5sum[5] << 8 | md5sum[6] << 16 | md5sum[7] << 24;

  /* Scan the bits corresponding to this event. A zero bit means we have
  not seen it before. Ensure all bits are set to record this event. */

  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit checking uniqueness of %s\n", unique);

  seen = TRUE;
  for (n = 0; n < 8; n++, hash += hinc)
    {
    int bit = 1 << (hash % 8);
    int byte = (hash / 8) % dbdb->bloom_size;
    if ((dbdb->bloom[byte] & bit) == 0)
      {
      dbdb->bloom[byte] |= bit;
      seen = FALSE;
      }
    }

  /* If this event has occurred before, do not count it. */

  if (seen)
    {
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event found in Bloom filter\n");
    count = 0.0;
    }
  else
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event added to Bloom filter\n");
  }

/* If there was no previous ratelimit data block for this key, initialize
the new one, otherwise update the block from the database. The initial rate
is what would be computed by the code below for an infinite interval. */

if (!dbd)
  {
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit initializing new key's rate data\n");
  dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
  dbd->gen.time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
  dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
  dbd->rate = count;
  }
else
  {
  /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
  average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
  a fixed sampling interval is:  f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
  where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.

  Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
  samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
  is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
  that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
  sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).

  The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
  comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
  message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.

  It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
  to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
  This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
  messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i

    rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
           = k + a * rate_0
    rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
           = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
    rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
    rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
           = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
           = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)

  When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.

    rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
    a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
    N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
    N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))

  Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
  increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
  rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
  maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
  messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */

  double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
                   + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
  double prev_time = (double)dbd->gen.time_stamp
                   + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;

  /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
  backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
  rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */

  double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
                  : this_time - prev_time;

  double i_over_p = interval / period;
  double a = exp(-i_over_p);

  /* Combine the instantaneous rate (period / interval) with the previous rate
  using the smoothing factor a. In order to measure sized events, multiply the
  instantaneous rate by the count of bytes or recipients etc. */

  dbd->gen.time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
  dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
  dbd->rate = (1 - a) * count / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;

  /* When events are very widely spaced the computed rate tends towards zero.
  Although this is accurate it turns out not to be useful for our purposes,
  especially when the first event after a long silence is the start of a spam
  run. A more useful model is that the rate for an isolated event should be the
  size of the event per the period size, ignoring the lack of events outside
  the current period and regardless of where the event falls in the period. So,
  if the interval was so long that the calculated rate is unhelpfully small, we
  re-initialize the rate. In the absence of higher-rate bursts, the condition
  below is true if the interval is greater than the period. */

  if (dbd->rate < count) dbd->rate = count;
  }

/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit.
This matters for edge cases such as a limit of zero, when the client
should be completely blocked. */

rc = dbd->rate < limit ? FAIL : OK;

/* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
rate preventing them from getting any email through. If readonly is set,
neither leaky nor strict are set, so we do not do any updates. */

if ((rc == FAIL && leaky) || strict)
  {
  dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbdb, dbdb_size);
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db updated\n");
  }
else
  {
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
    readonly? "readonly mode" : "over the limit, but leaky");
  }

dbfn_close(dbm);

/* Store the result in the tree for future reference.  Take the taint status
from the key for consistency even though it's unlikely we'll ever expand this. */

t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key), key);
t->data.ptr = dbd;
Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
(void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);

/* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */

store_pool = old_pool;
sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);

HDEBUG(acl)
  debug_printf_indent("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);

return rc;
}



/*************************************************
*      Handle a check for previously-seen        *
*************************************************/

/*
ACL clauses like:   seen = -5m / key=$foo / readonly

Return is true for condition-true - but the semantics
depend heavily on the actual use-case.

Negative times test for seen-before, positive for seen-more-recently-than
(the given interval before current time).

All are subject to history not having been cleaned from the DB.

Default for seen-before is to create if not present, and to
update if older than 10d (with the seen-test time).
Default for seen-since is to always create or update.

Options:
  key=value.  Default key is $sender_host_address
  readonly
  write
  refresh=<interval>:  update an existing DB entry older than given
			amount.  Default refresh lacking this option is 10d.
			The update sets the record timestamp to the seen-test time.

XXX do we need separate nocreate, noupdate controls?

Arguments:
  arg         the option string for seen=
  where       ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
  log_msgptr  for error messages

Returns:       OK        - Condition is true
               FAIL      - Condition is false
               DEFER     - Problem opening history database
               ERROR     - Syntax error in options
*/

static int
acl_seen(const uschar * arg, int where, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
enum { SEEN_DEFAULT, SEEN_READONLY, SEEN_WRITE };

const uschar * list = arg;
int slash = '/', interval, mode = SEEN_DEFAULT, yield = FAIL;
BOOL before;
int refresh = 10 * 24 * 60 * 60;	/* 10 days */
const uschar * ele, * key = sender_host_address;
open_db dbblock, * dbm;
dbdata_seen * dbd;
time_t now;

/* Parse the first element, the time-relation. */

if (!(ele = string_nextinlist(&list, &slash, NULL, 0)))
  goto badparse;
if ((before = *ele == '-'))
  ele++;
if ((interval = readconf_readtime(ele, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
  goto badparse;

/* Remaining elements are options */

while ((ele = string_nextinlist(&list, &slash, NULL, 0)))
  if (Ustrncmp(ele, "key=", 4) == 0)
    key = ele + 4;
  else if (Ustrcmp(ele, "readonly") == 0)
    mode = SEEN_READONLY;
  else if (Ustrcmp(ele, "write") == 0)
    mode = SEEN_WRITE;
  else if (Ustrncmp(ele, "refresh=", 8) == 0)
    {
    if ((refresh = readconf_readtime(ele + 8, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
      goto badparse;
    }
  else
    goto badopt;

if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"seen", O_RDWR|O_CREAT, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
  {
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("database for 'seen' not available\n");
  *log_msgptr = US"database for 'seen' not available";
  return DEFER;
  }

dbd = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, NULL);
now = time(NULL);
if (dbd)		/* an existing record */
  {
  time_t diff = now - dbd->gen.time_stamp;  /* time since record was written */

  if (before ? diff >= interval : diff < interval)
    yield = OK;

  if (mode == SEEN_READONLY)
    { HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db not written (readonly)\n"); }
  else if (mode == SEEN_WRITE || !before)
    {
    dbfn_write_ts(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(*dbd), now);
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db written (update)\n");
    }
  else if (diff >= refresh)
    {
    dbfn_write_ts(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(*dbd), now - interval);
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db written (refresh)\n");
    }
  }
else
  {			/* No record found, yield always FAIL */
  if (mode != SEEN_READONLY)
    {
    dbdata_seen d = {0};
    dbfn_write_ts(dbm, key, &d, sizeof(d), now);
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db written (create)\n");
    }
  else
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db not written (readonly)\n");
  }

dbfn_close(dbm);
return yield;


badparse:
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to parse '%s'", arg);
  return ERROR;
badopt:
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised option '%s' in '%s'", ele, arg);
  return ERROR;
}



/*************************************************
*            The udpsend ACL modifier            *
*************************************************/

/* Called by acl_check_condition() below.

Arguments:
  arg          the option string for udpsend=
  log_msgptr   for error messages

Returns:       OK        - Completed.
               DEFER     - Problem with DNS lookup.
               ERROR     - Syntax error in options.
*/

static int
acl_udpsend(const uschar * arg, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
int sep = 0;
uschar * hostname;
const uschar * portstr, * portend;
host_item * h;
int portnum, len, r, s;
uschar * errstr;

hostname = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
portstr = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);

if (!hostname)
  {
  *log_msgptr = US"missing destination host in \"udpsend\" modifier";
  return ERROR;
  }
if (!portstr)
  {
  *log_msgptr = US"missing destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
  return ERROR;
  }
if (!arg)
  {
  *log_msgptr = US"missing datagram payload in \"udpsend\" modifier";
  return ERROR;
  }
portnum = Ustrtol(portstr, &portend, 10);
if (*portend != '\0')
  {
  *log_msgptr = US"bad destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
  return ERROR;
  }

/* Make a single-item host list. */
h = store_get(sizeof(host_item), GET_UNTAINTED);
memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item));
h->name = hostname;
h->port = portnum;
h->mx = MX_NONE;

if (string_is_ip_address(hostname, NULL))
  h->address = hostname, r = HOST_FOUND;
else
  r = host_find_byname(h, NULL, 0, NULL, FALSE);
if (r == HOST_FIND_FAILED || r == HOST_FIND_AGAIN)
  {
  *log_msgptr = US"DNS lookup failed in \"udpsend\" modifier";
  return DEFER;
  }

HDEBUG(acl)
  debug_printf_indent("udpsend [%s]:%d %s\n", h->address, portnum, arg);

/*XXX this could better use sendto */
r = s = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_DGRAM, h->address, portnum, portnum,
		1, NULL, &errstr, NULL);
if (r < 0) goto defer;
len = Ustrlen(arg);
r = send(s, arg, len, 0);
if (r < 0)
  {
  errstr = US strerror(errno);
  close(s);
  goto defer;
  }
close(s);
if (r < len)
  {
  *log_msgptr =
    string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" truncated from %d to %d octets", len, r);
  return DEFER;
  }

HDEBUG(acl)
  debug_printf_indent("udpsend %d bytes\n", r);

return OK;

defer:
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" failed: %s", errstr);
return DEFER;
}



#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
/*************************************************
*   The "wellknown" ACL modifier                 *
*************************************************/

/* Called by acl_check_condition() below.

Retrieve the given file and encode content as xtext.
Prefix with a summary line giving the length of plaintext.
Leave a global pointer to the whole, for output by
the smtp verb handler code (smtp_in.c).

Arguments:
  arg          the option string for wellknown=
  log_msgptr   for error messages

Returns:       OK/FAIL
*/

static int
wellknown_process(const uschar * arg, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
struct stat statbuf;
FILE * rf;
gstring * g;

wellknown_response = NULL;
if (f.no_multiline_responses) return FAIL;

/* Check for file existence */

if (!*arg) return FAIL;
if (Ustat(arg, &statbuf) != 0)
  { *log_msgptr = US"stat"; goto fail; }

/*XXX perhaps refuse to serve a group- or world-writeable file? */

if (!(rf = Ufopen(arg, "r")))
  { *log_msgptr = US"open"; goto fail; }

/* Set up summary line for output */

g = string_fmt_append(NULL, "SIZE=%lu\n", (long) statbuf.st_size);

#define LINE_LIM 75
for (int n = 0, ch; (ch = fgetc(rf)) != EOF; )
  {
  /* Xtext-encode, adding output linebreaks for input linebreaks
  or when the line gets long enough */

  if (ch == '\n')
    { g = string_fmt_append(g, "+%02X", ch); n = LINE_LIM; }
  else if (ch < 33 || ch > 126 || ch == '+' || ch == '=')
    { g = string_fmt_append(g, "+%02X", ch); n += 3; }
  else
    { g = string_fmt_append(g, "%c", ch); n++; }

  if (n >= LINE_LIM)
    { g = string_catn(g, US"\n", 1); n = 0; }
  }
#undef LINE_LIM

gstring_release_unused(g);
wellknown_response = string_from_gstring(g);
return OK;

fail:
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("wellknown: failed to %s file %q: %s",
		  *log_msgptr, arg, strerror(errno));
  return FAIL;
}
#endif


/*************************************************
*   Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item   *
*************************************************/

/* Called from acl_check() below.

Arguments:
  verb         ACL verb
  cb           ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
  where        where called from
  addr         the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
  level        the nesting level
  epp          pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
                 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
  user_msgptr  user message pointer
  log_msgptr   log message pointer
  basic_errno  pointer to where to put verify error

Returns:       OK        - all conditions are met
               DISCARD   - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
                             for "accept" or "discard" verbs
               FAIL      - at least one condition fails
               FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
               DEFER     - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
                             but can be temporary callout problem)
               ERROR     - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
                             error
*/

static int
acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block * cb, int where,
  address_item * addr, int level, BOOL * epp, uschar ** user_msgptr,
  uschar ** log_msgptr, int * basic_errno)
{
uschar * user_message = NULL, * log_message = NULL;
int rc = OK;

for (; cb; cb = cb->next)
  {
  const uschar * arg;
  int control_type;
  BOOL textonly = FALSE;

  switch (cb->type)
    {
    /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
    case of rejection. They are expanded later. */

    case ACLC_MESSAGE:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("  message: %s\n", cb->arg);
      user_message = cb->arg;	continue;

    case ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("l_message: %s\n", cb->arg);
      log_message = cb->arg;	continue;

    /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
    checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */

    case ACLC_ENDPASS:
      *epp = TRUE;		continue;
    }

  /* Show condition, before expansion */
   {
    int lhswidth = 0;

    HDEBUG(acl|expand)
      {
      debug_printf_indent("check %s%s %n",
	(!(conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_MOD) && cb->u.negated) ? "!":"",
	conditions[cb->type].name, &lhswidth);

      if (cb->type == ACLC_SET || cb->type == ACLC_SET_TAINTED)
	{
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
	if (  Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0
	   || Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
	  {
	  debug_printf("%s ", cb->u.varname);
	  lhswidth += 19;
	  }
	else
#endif
	  {
	  debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
	  lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
	  }
	}

      debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
      }

    /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
    of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
    checking functions in some cases. */

    if (!(conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_EXP))
      arg = cb->arg;

    else if (!(arg = expand_string_2(cb->arg, &textonly)))
      {
      if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
      *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string %q: %s",
	cb->arg, expand_string_message);
      return f.search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
      }

    /* Show expanded condition if it's different */

    HDEBUG(acl|expand) if (arg != cb->arg)
	debug_printf("%*s %s\n", lhswidth+1, "=", CS arg);
   }

  /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */

  if ((conditions[cb->type].forbids & (1 << where)) != 0)
    {
    *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
      conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_MOD ? "use" : "test",
      conditions[cb->type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
    return ERROR;
    }

  /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
  action for the remaining modifiers. */

  switch(cb->type)
    {
    /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
    "discard" verb. */

    case ACLC_ACL:
      rc = acl_check_wargs(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
      if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
        {
        *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
          "%q command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
          verbs[verb]);
        return ERROR;
        }
      break;

    case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
      setup_header(arg);
      break;

    case ACLC_ATRN_DOMAINS:
      if (is_tainted(arg))
	{
	log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
		  "attempt to used tainted value '%s' for atrn_domains%#s",
		    arg,
		    config_lineno
		    ? string_sprintf(" (%s %d)", config_filename, config_lineno)
		    : NULL);
	*log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
        return ERROR;
	}
      atrn_domains = string_copy(arg);
      expand_level++;
      rc = spool_has_one_undelivered_dom(arg);
      expand_level--;
      break;

    case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
      rc = sender_host_authenticated ? match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated,
	      &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL) : FAIL;
      break;

    case ACLC_CONDITION:
    /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
    expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
    different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
      if (*arg == '-'
	  ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1)    /* Negative number */
	  : Ustrspn(arg,   "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg))     /* Digits, or empty */
	rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
      else
	rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
	      strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
	     (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
	      strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
      if (rc == DEFER)
	*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value %q", arg);
      break;

    case ACLC_CONTINUE:    /* Always succeeds */
      break;

    case ACLC_CONTROL:
      {
      const uschar * p = NULL;
      control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);

      /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */

      if (controls_list[control_type].forbids & (1 << where))
	{
	*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
	  controls_list[control_type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
	return ERROR;
	}

      /*XXX ought to sort these, just for sanity */
      switch(control_type)
	{
	case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
	  f.allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
	  break;

#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
	case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
	  f.dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_DMARC
	  /* Since DKIM was blocked, skip DMARC too */
	  f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
	  f.dmarc_enable_forensic = FALSE;
# endif
	break;
#endif

#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_DMARC
	case CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY:
	  f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC:
	  f.dmarc_enable_forensic = TRUE;
	  break;
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_DSCP
	case CONTROL_DSCP:
	  {
	  misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_find(US"dscp", &log_message);
	  typedef uschar * (*fn_t)(const uschar *, const uschar *);
	  if (!mi)
	    rc = DEFER;
	  else if ((*log_msgptr = ((fn_t *) mi->functions)[DSCP_ACL] (arg, p)))
	    rc = ERROR;
	  break;
	  }
#endif

	case CONTROL_ERROR:
	  return ERROR;

	case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
	  deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
	  deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
	  smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
	  smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
	  break;

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
	case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
	  f.no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
	  break;
#endif

	case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
	  f.no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
	  f.pipelining_enable = FALSE;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
	  f.disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
	  f.disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
	  cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"fakereject");
	case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
	  fake_response = control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER ? DEFER : FAIL;
	  if (*p == '/')
	    {
	    const uschar *pp = p + 1;
	    while (*pp) pp++;
	    /* The entire control= line was expanded at top so no need to expand
	    the part after the / */
	    fake_response_text = string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1);
	    p = pp;
	    }
	   else /* Explicitly reset to default string */
	    fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
	  break;

	case CONTROL_FREEZE:
	  f.deliver_freeze = TRUE;
	  deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
	  freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config;       /* Reset to configured value */
	  if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
	    {
	    p += 8;
	    freeze_tell = NULL;
	    }
	  if (*p)
	    {
	    *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
	    return ERROR;
	    }
	  cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"item frozen");
	  break;

	case CONTROL_QUEUE:
	  f.queue_only_policy = TRUE;
	  if (Ustrcmp(p, "_only") == 0)
	    p += 5;
	  else while (*p == '/')
	    if (Ustrncmp(p, "/only", 5) == 0)
	      { p += 5; f.queue_smtp = FALSE; }
	    else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/first_pass_route", 17) == 0)
	      { p += 17; f.queue_smtp = TRUE; }
	    else
	      break;
	  cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"queueing forced");
	  break;

	case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
	  originator_name = US"";
	  f.submission_mode = TRUE;
	  while (*p == '/')
	    {
	    if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
	      {
	      p += 14;
	      f.active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
	      f.active_local_from_check = FALSE;
	      }
	    else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
	      {
	      const uschar *pp = p + 8;
	      while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
	      submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
	      p = pp;
	      }
	    /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
	    the string. */
	    else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
	      {
	      const uschar *pp = p + 6;
	      while (*pp) pp++;
	      submission_name = parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6);
	      p = pp;
	      }
	    else break;
	    }
	  if (*p)
	    {
	    *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
	    return ERROR;
	    }
	  break;

	case CONTROL_DEBUG:
	  {
	  const uschar * debug_tag = NULL, * debug_opts = NULL;
	  BOOL kill = FALSE, stop = FALSE;

	  while (*p == '/')
	    {
	    const uschar * pp = p+1;
	    if (Ustrncmp(pp, "tag=", 4) == 0)
	      {
	      for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
	      debug_tag = string_copyn(p+5, pp-p-5);
	      }
	    else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "opts=", 5) == 0)
	      {
	      for (pp += 5; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
	      debug_opts = string_copyn(p+6, pp-p-6);
	      }
	    else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "kill", 4) == 0)
	      {
	      pp += 4;
	      kill = TRUE;
	      }
	    else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "stop", 4) == 0)
	      {
	      pp += 4;
	      stop = TRUE;
	      }
	    else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pretrigger=", 11) == 0)
		debug_pretrigger_setup(pp += 11);
	    else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "trigger=", 8) == 0)
	      {
	      if (Ustrncmp(pp += 8, "now", 3) == 0)
		{
		pp += 3;
		debug_trigger_fire();
		}
	      else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "paniclog", 8) == 0)
		{
		pp += 8;
		dtrigger_selector |= BIT(DTi_panictrigger);
		}
	      }
	    while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
	    p = pp;
	    }

	  if (kill)
	    debug_logging_stop(TRUE);
	  else if (stop)
	    debug_logging_stop(FALSE);
	  else if (debug_tag || debug_opts)
	    debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
	  break;
	  }

	case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
	  f.suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
	  break;

	case CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY:
	  {
	  uschar * ignored = NULL;
#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
	  if (prdr_requested)
#else
	  if (0)
#endif
	    /* Too hard to think about for now.  We might in future cutthrough
	    the case where both sides handle prdr and this-node prdr acl
	    is "accept" */
	    ignored = US"PRDR active";
	  else if (f.deliver_freeze)
	    ignored = US"frozen";
	  else if (f.queue_only_policy)
	    ignored = US"queue-only";
	  else if (fake_response == FAIL)
	    ignored = US"fakereject";
	  else if (rcpt_count != 1)
	    ignored = US"nonfirst rcpt";
	  else if (cutthrough.delivery)
	    ignored = US"repeated";
	  else if (cutthrough.callout_hold_only)
	    {
	    DEBUG(acl)
	      debug_printf_indent(" cutthrough request upgrades callout hold\n");
	    cutthrough.callout_hold_only = FALSE;
	    cutthrough.delivery = TRUE;	/* control accepted */
	    }
	  else
	    {
	    cutthrough.delivery = TRUE;	/* control accepted */
	    while (*p == '/')
	      {
	      const uschar * pp = p+1;
	      if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
		{
		pp += 6;
		if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
		/* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool", 5) == 0) ;	default */
		}
	      else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "sender=", 7) == 0)
		{
		pp += 7;
		if (Ustrncmp(pp, "transport", 9) == 0)
		  cutthrough.tpt_sender = TRUE;
		/* else if (Ustrcmp(pp, "orig") == 0) ;	default */
		}
	      while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
	      p = pp;
	      }
	    }

	  DEBUG(acl) if (ignored)
	    debug_printf(" cutthrough request ignored on %s item\n", ignored);
	  }
	break;

#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
	case CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT:
	  if (*p == '/')
	    {
	    if (p[1] == '1')
	      {
	      message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
	      addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
	      addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
	      p += 2;
	      break;
	      }
	    if (p[1] == '0')
	      {
	      message_utf8_downconvert = 0;
	      addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
	      addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
	      p += 2;
	      break;
	      }
	    if (p[1] == '-' && p[2] == '1')
	      {
	      message_utf8_downconvert = -1;
	      addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
	      addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = TRUE;
	      p += 3;
	      break;
	      }
	    *log_msgptr = US"bad option value for control=utf8_downconvert";
	    }
	  else
	    {
	    message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
	    addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
	    addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
	    break;
	    }
	  return ERROR;
#endif	/*I18N*/

#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
	case CONTROL_WELLKNOWN:
	  rc = *p == '/' ? wellknown_process(p+1, log_msgptr) : FAIL;
	  break;
#endif
	}
      break;
      }

#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
    case ACLC_DCC:
      {
      /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
      const uschar * list = arg;
      int sep = -'/';
      uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
      /* Run the dcc backend. */
      rc = dcc_process(&ss);
      /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
      while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
        if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
          rc = FAIL;   /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
      break;
      }
#endif

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
    case ACLC_DECODE:
      rc = mime_decode(&arg);
      break;
#endif

    case ACLC_DELAY:
      {
      int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
      if (delay < 0)
        {
        *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
          "modifier: %q is not a time value", arg);
        return ERROR;
        }
      else
        {
        HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
          delay);
        if (host_checking)
          {
          HDEBUG(acl)
            debug_printf_indent("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
          }

	/* NOTE 1: Remember that we may be
        dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
        Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
        smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.

        NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
        apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
        */

        else
          {
          if (smtp_out_fd >= 0 && !f.disable_delay_flush)
	    smtp_fflush(SFF_UNCORK);

#if !defined(NO_POLL_H) && defined (POLLRDHUP)
	    {
	    struct pollfd p;
	    nfds_t n = 0;
	    if (smtp_out_fd >= 0)
	      {
	      p.fd = smtp_out_fd;
	      p.events = POLLRDHUP;
	      n = 1;
	      }
	    if (poll(&p, n, delay*1000) > 0)
	      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("delay cancelled by peer close\n");
	    }
#else
	  /* Lacking POLLRDHUP it appears to be impossible to detect that a
	  TCP/IP connection has gone away without reading from it. This means
	  that we cannot shorten the delay below if the client goes away,
	  because we cannot discover that the client has closed its end of the
	  connection. (The connection is actually in a half-closed state,
	  waiting for the server to close its end.) It would be nice to be able
	  to detect this state, so that the Exim process is not held up
	  unnecessarily. However, it seems that we can't. The poll() function
	  does not do the right thing, and in any case it is not always
	  available.  */

          while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
#endif
          }
        }
      break;
      }

#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
    case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
    case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
      /* See comment on ACLC_SPF wrt. coding issues */
      {
      misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_find(US"dkim", &log_message);
      typedef int (*fn_t)(const uschar *);
      rc = mi
	? (((fn_t *) mi->functions)
		      [cb->type == ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER
			? DKIM_SIGNER_ISINLIST
			: DKIM_STATUS_LISTMATCH]) (arg)
	: DEFER;
      break;
      }
#endif

#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_DMARC
    case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS:
      /* See comment on ACLC_SPF wrt. coding issues */
      {
      misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_find(US"dmarc", &log_message);
      typedef int (*pfn_t)(void);
      typedef int (*mfn_t)(const uschar * const *);

      if (!mi)
	rc = DEFER;				/* shouldn't happen */
      else
	{
	if (!f.dmarc_has_been_checked)		/* only once per message */
	  {
	  (void) (((pfn_t *) mi->functions)[DMARC_PROCESS]) ();
	  f.dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
	  }
	rc = (((mfn_t *) mi->functions)[DMARC_RESULT_INLIST]) (&arg);
	}
      }
      break;
#endif

    case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
      rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, arg, log_msgptr);
      break;

    case ACLC_DOMAINS:
      rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
	addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
      break;

    /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
    TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
    cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
    what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
    writing is poorly documented. */

    case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
      if (!tls_in.cipher) rc = FAIL;
      else
	{
	uschar * endcipher = NULL;
	const uschar * cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':');

	if (!cipher) cipher = tls_in.cipher;
	else
	  {
	  endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
	  if (endcipher) *endcipher = 0;
	  }
	rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL,NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
	if (endcipher) *endcipher = ':';
	}
      break;

    /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
    we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
    set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
    comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
    permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
    message in the same SMTP connection. */

    case ACLC_HOSTS:
      rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
	sender_host_address ? sender_host_address : US"", CUSS &host_data);
      if (rc == DEFER) *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
      if (host_data) host_data = string_copy_perm(host_data, TRUE);
      break;

    case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
      rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
	&localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
	CUSS &deliver_localpart_data);
      break;

    case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
      {
      int logbits = 0, sep = 0;
      const uschar * s = arg;

      for (uschar * ss; ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, NULL, 0); )
        {
        if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
        else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
        else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT;
        else
          {
          logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
          log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name %q in "
            "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]);
          }
        }
      log_reject_target = logbits;
      break;
      }

    case ACLC_LOGWRITE:
      {
      int logbits = 0;
      const uschar *s = arg;
      if (*s == ':')
        {
        s++;
        while (*s != ':')
          {
          if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
            { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
          else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
            { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
          else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
            { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
          else
            {
            logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
            s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in %q in "
              "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
            }
          if (*s == ',') s++;
          }
        s++;
        }
      Uskip_whitespace(&s);

      if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
      log_write(logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
      break;
      }

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
    case ACLC_MALWARE:			/* Run the malware backend. */
      {
      /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
      const uschar * list = arg;
      BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
      int timeout = 0, sep = -'/';
      const uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);

      for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0); )
        if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0)
	  defer_ok = TRUE;
	else if (  strncmpic(opt, US"tmo=", 4) == 0
		&& (timeout = readconf_readtime(opt+4, '\0', FALSE)) < 0
		)
	  {
	  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad timeout value in '%s'", opt);
	  return ERROR;
	  }

      rc = malware(ss, textonly, timeout);
      if (rc == DEFER && defer_ok)
	rc = FAIL;	/* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
      break;
      }

    case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
      rc = mime_regex(&arg, textonly);
      break;
#endif

    case ACLC_QUEUE:
      if (is_tainted(arg))
	{
	*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted",
				      arg);
	return ERROR;
	}
      if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
	{
	*log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
		"Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
	return ERROR;
	}
      queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE);
      break;

    case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
      rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
      break;

    case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
      rc = match_address_list(CUS addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
	CUSS &recipient_data);
      break;

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
    case ACLC_REGEX:
      rc = exim_regex(&arg, textonly);
      break;
#endif

    case ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER:
      setup_remove_header(arg);
      break;

    case ACLC_SEEN:
      rc = acl_seen(arg, where, log_msgptr);
      break;

    case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
      {
      uschar *sdomain;
      sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
      sdomain = sdomain ? sdomain + 1 : US"";
      rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
        sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
      break;
      }

    case ACLC_SENDERS:
      rc = match_address_list(CUS sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
	sender_address_cache, -1, 0, CUSS &sender_data);
      break;

    /* Connection variables must persist forever; message variables not */

    case ACLC_SET:
    case ACLC_SET_TAINTED:
      {
      int old_pool = store_pool;
      uschar * s;
      if (  cb->u.varname[0] != 'm'
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
	 || event_name		/* An event is being delivered */
#endif
	 )
        store_pool = POOL_PERM;

      s = cb->type == ACLC_SET_TAINTED
	      ? string_copy_taint(arg, GET_TAINTED) : string_copy(arg);

#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM	/* Overwriteable dkim result variables */
      if (  Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0
	 || Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0
         )
	  {
	  misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_findonly(US"dkim");
	  typedef void (*fn_t)(const uschar *, void *);
	  
	  if (mi)
	    (((fn_t *) mi->functions)[DKIM_SETVAR]) (cb->u.varname, s);
	  }
      else
#endif
	acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = s;
      store_pool = old_pool;
      break;
      }

#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
    case ACLC_SPAM:
      {
      /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
      const uschar * list = arg;
      int sep = -'/';
      uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);

      rc = spam(CUSS &ss);
      /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
      while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
        if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
          rc = FAIL;	/* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
      break;
      }
#endif

#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SPF
    case ACLC_SPF:
    case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
      /* We have hardwired function-call numbers, and also prototypes for the
      functions.  We could do a function name table search or (simpler)
      a module include file with defines for the numbers
      but I can't see how to deal with prototypes.  Is a K&R non-prototyped
      function still usable with today's compilers (but we would lose on
      type-checking)?  We could macroize the typedef, and even the function
      table access - but it obscures how it works rather. */
      {
      misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_find(US"spf", &log_message);
      typedef int (*fn_t)(const uschar **, const uschar *, int);
      fn_t fn;

      if (!mi)
	{ rc = DEFER; break; }			/* shouldn't happen */

      fn = ((fn_t *) mi->functions)[SPF_PROCESS];

      rc = fn(&arg, sender_address,
	      cb->type == ACLC_SPF ? SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL : SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
      break;
      }
#endif

    case ACLC_UDPSEND:
      rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr);
      break;

    /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
    such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
    only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
    $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
    (until something changes it). */

    case ACLC_VERIFY:
      rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
      if (*user_msgptr)
	acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
      if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
      break;

    default:
      log_write_die(LOG_MAIN, "internal ACL error: unknown "
	"condition %d", cb->type);
      break;
    }

  /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */

  if (!(conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_MOD) && cb->u.negated)
    if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
    else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;

  if (rc != OK) break;   /* Conditions loop */
  }


/* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make
it the same as the user message.

"message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.

"log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
message that is already set.

Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but
for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and
when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no
"endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is
present. */

if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;

if ((BIT(rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
  {
  uschar *expmessage;
  uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
  uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;

  /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
  nested ACLs) are always discarded. This also happens for acceptance verbs
  when they actually do accept. Only messages specified at this level are used.
  However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
  during expansions. */

  if (verb == ACL_WARN ||
      (rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
    *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;

  if (user_message)
    {
    acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
    expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
    if (!expmessage)
      {
      if (!f.expand_string_forcedfail)
        log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message %q: %s",
          user_message, expand_string_message);
      }
    else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
    }

  if (log_message)
    {
    acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
    expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
    if (!expmessage)
      {
      if (!f.expand_string_forcedfail)
        log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message %q: %s",
          log_message, expand_string_message);
      }
    else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
      {
      *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
        string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
      }
    }

  /* If no log message, default it to the user message */

  if (!*log_msgptr) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
  }

acl_verify_message = NULL;
return rc;
}





/*************************************************
*        Get line from a literal ACL             *
*************************************************/

/* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).

This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
Exim configuration file. That is:

  . Leading spaces are ignored.

  . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
    are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
    significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.

  . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
    may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.

  . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.

Arguments: none
Returns:   a pointer to the next line
*/


static uschar * acl_text;          /* Current pointer in the text */
static uschar * acl_text_end;      /* Points one past the terminating '0' */


static uschar *
acl_getline(void)
{
uschar *yield;

/* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */

for(;;)
  {
  Uskip_whitespace(&acl_text);   	/* Leading spaces/empty lines */
  if (!*acl_text) return NULL;		/* No more data */
  yield = acl_text;			/* Potential data line */

  while (*acl_text && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;

  /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
  it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */

  if (!*acl_text) return *yield == '#' ? NULL : yield;

  /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
  start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */

  if (*yield != '#') break;
  }

/* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */

for(;;)
  {
  uschar *cont;
  for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);

  /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
  return it. */

  if (*cont != '\\')
    {
    *acl_text++ = 0;
    return yield;
    }

  /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
  the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
  comment lines. */

  for (;;)
    {
    while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
    if (*acl_text != '#') break;
    while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
    }

  /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
  to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
  newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */

  memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
  acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
  acl_text = cont;
  while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
  if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
  }

/* Control does not reach here */
}





/************************************************/
/* For error messages, a string describing the config location
associated with current processing. NULL if not in an ACL. */

uschar *
acl_current_verb(void)
{
if (acl_current) return string_sprintf(" (ACL %s, %s %d)",
    verbs[acl_current->verb], acl_current->srcfile, acl_current->srcline);
return NULL;
}

/*************************************************
*        Check access using an ACL               *
*************************************************/

/* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
appears immediately above.

Arguments:
  where        where called from
  addr         address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
  s            the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
  user_msgptr  where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
  log_msgptr   where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)

Returns:       OK         access is granted
               DISCARD    access is apparently granted...
               FAIL       access is denied
               FAIL_DROP  access is denied; drop the connection
               DEFER      can't tell at the moment
               ERROR      disaster
*/

static int
acl_check_internal(int where, address_item * addr, uschar * s,
  uschar ** user_msgptr, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
int fd = -1;
acl_block * acl = NULL;
uschar * acl_name = US"inline ACL", * ss;

/* Catch configuration loops */

if (acl_level > 20)
  {
  *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
  return ERROR;
  }

if (!s)
  {
  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
  return FAIL;
  }

/* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
been expanded as part of condition processing. */

if (acl_level != 0)
  ss = s;
else if (!(ss = expand_string(s)))
  {
  if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string %q: %s", s,
    expand_string_message);
  return ERROR;
  }

Uskip_whitespace(&ss);

/* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
(Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */

acl_text = ss;

if (is_tainted(acl_text) && !f.running_in_test_harness)
  {
  log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
    "attempt to use tainted ACL text %q", acl_text);
  /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
  *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
  return ERROR;
  }

/* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */

if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
  {
  const tree_node * t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
  if (t)
    {
    if (!(acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr)))
      {
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL %q is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
      return FAIL;
      }
    acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL %s", ss);
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("using ACL %q\n", ss);
    }

  else if (*ss == '/')
    {
    struct stat statbuf;
    if ((fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
      {
      *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file %q: %s", ss,
        strerror(errno));
      return ERROR;
      }
    if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
      {
      *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file %q: %s", ss,
        strerror(errno));
      return ERROR;
      }

    /* If the string being used as a filename is tainted, so is the file content */
    acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1, ss);
    acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;

    if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
      {
      *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file %q: %s",
        ss, strerror(errno));
      return ERROR;
      }
    acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
    (void)close(fd);

    acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL %s", ss);
    HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
    }
  }

/* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
persists between multiple messages. */

if (!acl)
  {
  int old_pool = store_pool;
  if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
  acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
  store_pool = old_pool;
  if (!acl && *log_msgptr) return ERROR;
  if (fd >= 0)
    {
    tree_node * t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss), ss);
    Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
    t->data.ptr = acl;
    (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
    }
  }

/* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */

while ((acl_current = acl))
  {
  int cond;
  int basic_errno = 0;
  BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
  BOOL acl_quit_check = acl_level == 0
    && (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT);

  *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
  f.acl_temp_details = FALSE;

  config_filename = acl->srcfile;
  config_lineno = acl->srcline;

  HDEBUG(acl)
    {
    debug_printf_indent("processing %s %q", acl_name, verbs[acl->verb]);
    if (config_lineno) debug_printf(" (%s %d)", config_filename, config_lineno);
    debug_printf("\n");
    }

  /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
  this condition. */

  search_error_message = NULL;
  cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, acl_level,
    &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);

  /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
  ERROR always causes a return. */

  switch (cond)
    {
    case DEFER:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test deferred in %s\n",
	verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
      if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
	{
	if (search_error_message && *search_error_message)
	  *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
	if (smtp_return_error_details) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
	}
      else
	f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
      if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
      break;

    default:      /* Paranoia */
    case ERROR:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test error in %s\n",
	verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
      return ERROR;

    case OK:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test succeeded in %s\n",
	verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
      break;

    case FAIL:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test failed in %s\n",
	verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
      break;

    /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
    DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */

    case DISCARD:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\" in %s\n",
	verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
      break;

    case FAIL_DROP:
      HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\" in %s\n",
	verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
      break;
    }

  /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
  a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
  for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */

  switch(acl->verb)
    {
    case ACL_ACCEPT:
      if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: ACCEPT\n", acl_name);
	return cond;
	}
      if (endpass_seen)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
	return cond;
	}
      break;

    case ACL_DEFER:
      if (cond == OK)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DEFER\n", acl_name);
	if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
	f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
	return DEFER;
	}
      break;

    case ACL_DENY:
      if (cond == OK)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DENY\n", acl_name);
	if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
	return FAIL;
	}
      break;

    case ACL_DISCARD:
      if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DISCARD\n", acl_name);
	if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
	return DISCARD;
	}
      if (endpass_seen)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl)
	  debug_printf_indent("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
	return cond;
	}
      break;

    case ACL_DROP:
      if (cond == OK)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DROP\n", acl_name);
	if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
	return FAIL_DROP;
	}
      break;

    case ACL_REQUIRE:
      if (cond != OK)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: not OK\n", acl_name);
	if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
	return cond;
	}
      break;

    case ACL_WARN:
      if (cond == OK)
	acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
      else if (cond == DEFER && LOGGING(acl_warn_skipped))
	if (config_lineno > 0)
	  log_write(LOG_MAIN,
	    "%s Warning: ACL 'warn' statement skipped (in %s at line %d of %s):"
	    " condition test deferred%s%s",
	    host_and_ident(TRUE), acl_name, config_lineno, config_filename,
	    *log_msgptr ? US": " : US"", *log_msgptr ? *log_msgptr : US"");
	else
	  log_write(LOG_MAIN,
	    "%s Warning: ACL 'warn' statement skipped (in %s):"
	    " condition test deferred%s%s",
	    host_and_ident(TRUE), acl_name,
	    *log_msgptr ? US": " : US"", *log_msgptr ? *log_msgptr : US"");
      *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;  /* In case implicit DENY follows */
      break;

    default:
      log_write_die(LOG_MAIN, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
	acl->verb);
      break;
    }

  /* Pass to the next ACL item */

  acl = acl->next;
  }

/* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */

HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
return FAIL;

badquit:
  *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("QUIT or not-QUIT toplevel ACL may not fail "
    "('%s' verb used incorrectly)", verbs[acl->verb]);
  return ERROR;
}




/* Same args as acl_check_internal() above, but the string s is
the name of an ACL followed optionally by up to 9 space-separated arguments.
The name and args are separately expanded.  Args go into $acl_arg globals. */
static int
acl_check_wargs(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *s,
  uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
{
uschar * tmp;
uschar * tmp_arg[9];	/* must match acl_arg[] */
uschar * sav_arg[9];	/* must match acl_arg[] */
int sav_narg;
uschar * name;
int i;
int ret;

if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(name = expand_string(tmp)))
  goto bad;

for (i = 0; i < 9; i++)
  {
  if (!Uskip_whitespace(&s))
    break;
  if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(tmp_arg[i] = expand_string(tmp)))
    {
    tmp = name;
    goto bad;
    }
  }

sav_narg = acl_narg;
acl_narg = i;
for (i = 0; i < acl_narg; i++)
  {
  sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
  acl_arg[i] = tmp_arg[i];
  }
while (i < 9)
  {
  sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
  acl_arg[i++] = NULL;
  }

acl_level++;
ret = acl_check_internal(where, addr, name, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
acl_level--;
config_lineno = 0;

acl_narg = sav_narg;
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) acl_arg[i] = sav_arg[i];
return ret;

bad:
if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return ERROR;
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string %q: %s",
  tmp, expand_string_message);
return f.search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
}



/*************************************************
*        Check access using an ACL               *
*************************************************/

/* Alternate interface for ACL, used by expansions */
int
acl_eval(int where, uschar * s, uschar ** user_msgptr, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
address_item adb, * addr = NULL;
int rc;

*user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
sender_verified_failed = NULL;
ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;

if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
  {
  adb = address_defaults;
  addr = &adb;
  addr->address = expand_string(US"$local_part@$domain");
  addr->domain = deliver_domain;
  addr->local_part = deliver_localpart;
  addr->cc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
  addr->lc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
  }

acl_text = s;
acl_text_end = s + Ustrlen(s) + 1;

acl_level++;
rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
acl_level--;
config_lineno = 0;
return rc;
}



/* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.

Arguments:
  where        ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
  recipient    RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
  s            the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
  user_msgptr  where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
  log_msgptr   where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)

Returns:       OK         access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
               DISCARD    access is granted by a DISCARD verb
               FAIL       access is denied
               FAIL_DROP  access is denied; drop the connection
               DEFER      can't tell at the moment
               ERROR      disaster
*/

int
acl_check(int where, const uschar * recipient, uschar * s,
  uschar ** user_msgptr, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
int rc;
address_item adb,  * addr = NULL;

*user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
sender_verified_failed = NULL;
ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;

#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY || where==ACL_WHERE_PRDR)
#else
if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY)
#endif
  {
  adb = address_defaults;
  addr = &adb;
  addr->address = recipient;
  if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
    {
    *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
    return DEFER;
    }
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
  if ((addr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
    {
    addr->prop.utf8_downcvt =       message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
    addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
    }
#endif
  deliver_domain = addr->domain;
  deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
  }

acl_where = where;
acl_level = 0;
rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
acl_level = 0;
acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
config_lineno = 0;

/* Cutthrough - if requested,
and WHERE_RCPT and not yet opened conn as result of recipient-verify,
and rcpt acl returned accept,
and first recipient (cancel on any subsequents)
open one now and run it up to RCPT acceptance.
A failed verify should cancel cutthrough request,
and will pass the fail to the originator.
Initial implementation:  dual-write to spool.
Assume the rxd datastream is now being copied byte-for-byte to an open cutthrough connection.

Cease cutthrough copy on rxd final dot; do not send one.

On a data acl, if not accept and a cutthrough conn is open, hard-close it (no SMTP niceness).

On data acl accept, terminate the dataphase on an open cutthrough conn.  If accepted or
perm-rejected, reflect that to the original sender - and dump the spooled copy.
If temp-reject, close the conn (and keep the spooled copy).
If conn-failure, no action (and keep the spooled copy).
*/
switch (where)
  {
  case ACL_WHERE_RCPT:
#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
  case ACL_WHERE_PRDR:
#endif

    if (f.host_checking_callout)	/* -bhc mode */
      cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"host-checking mode");

    else if (cutthrough.delivery)
      if (rc != OK)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent(
			"ignore cutthrough request; ACL did not accept\n");
	}
      else if (rcpt_count <= cutthrough.nrcpt)
	{
	HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent(
			"ignore cutthrough request; nonfirst message\n");
	}
      else if (  (rc = open_cutthrough_connection(addr, cutthrough.tpt_sender))
	      == DEFER)
	if (cutthrough.defer_pass)
	  {
	  uschar * s = addr->message;
	  /* Horrid kludge to recover target's SMTP message */
	  while (*s) s++;
	  do --s; while (!isdigit(*s));
	  if (*--s && isdigit(*s) && *--s && isdigit(*s)) *user_msgptr = s;
	  f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
	  }
	else
	  {
	  HDEBUG(acl) debug_printf_indent("cutthrough defer; will spool\n");
	  rc = OK;
	  }

    break;

  case ACL_WHERE_PREDATA:
    if (rc == OK)
      cutthrough_predata();
    else
      cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"predata acl not ok");
    break;

  case ACL_WHERE_QUIT:
  case ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT:
    /* Drop cutthrough conns, and drop heldopen verify conns if
    the previous was not DATA */
    {
    uschar prev =
      smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index))];
    BOOL dropverify = !(prev == SCH_DATA || prev == SCH_BDAT);

    cancel_cutthrough_connection(dropverify, US"quit or conndrop");
    break;
    }

  default:
    break;
  }

deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
  deliver_domain_data = sender_address_data = NULL;

/* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */

if (rc == DISCARD)
  {
  if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
    {
    log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
      "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
    return ERROR;
    }
  return DISCARD;
  }

/* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */

if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
  {
  log_write(LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
    "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
  return ERROR;
  }

/* Before giving a response, take a look at the length of any user message, and
split it up into multiple lines if possible. */

*user_msgptr = string_split_message(*user_msgptr);
if (fake_response != OK)
  fake_response_text = string_split_message(fake_response_text);

return rc;
}


/*************************************************
*             Create ACL variable                *
*************************************************/

/* Create an ACL variable or reuse an existing one. ACL variables are in a
binary tree (see tree.c) with acl_var_c and acl_var_m as root nodes.

Argument:
  name    pointer to the variable's name, starting with c or m

Returns   the pointer to variable's tree node
*/

tree_node *
acl_var_create(const uschar * name)
{
tree_node * node, ** root = name[0] == 'c' ? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
if (!(node = tree_search(*root, name)))
  {
  node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name), name);
  Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
  (void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
  }
node->data.ptr = NULL;
return node;
}



/*************************************************
*       Write an ACL variable in spool format    *
*************************************************/

/* This function is used as a callback for tree_walk when writing variables to
the spool file. To retain spool file compatibility, what is written is -aclc or
-aclm followed by the rest of the name and the data length, space separated,
then the value itself, starting on a new line, and terminated by an additional
newline. When we had only numbered ACL variables, the first line might look
like this: "-aclc 5 20". Now it might be "-aclc foo 20" for the variable called
acl_cfoo.

Arguments:
  name    of the variable
  value   of the variable
  ctx     FILE pointer (as a void pointer)

Returns:  nothing
*/

void
acl_var_write(uschar * name, uschar * value, void * ctx)
{
FILE * f = (FILE *)ctx;
putc('-', f);
if (is_tainted(value))
  {
  const uschar * quoter_name;
  putc('-', f);
  (void) quoter_for_address(value, &quoter_name);
  if (quoter_name)
    fprintf(f, "(%s)", quoter_name);
  }
fprintf(f, "acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);
}




uschar *
acl_standalone_setvar(const uschar * s, BOOL taint)
{
acl_condition_block * cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), GET_UNTAINTED);
uschar * errstr = NULL, * log_msg = NULL;
BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
int e;

cond->next = NULL;
cond->type = taint ? ACLC_SET_TAINTED : ACLC_SET;
if (!acl_varname_to_cond(&s, cond, &errstr)) return errstr;
if (!acl_data_to_cond(s, cond, US"'-be'", &errstr)) return errstr;

if (acl_check_condition(ACL_WARN, cond, ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN,
			    NULL, 0, &endpass_seen, &errstr, &log_msg, &e) != OK)
  return string_sprintf("oops: %s", errstr);
return string_sprintf("variable %s set", cond->u.varname);
}


#endif	/* !MACRO_PREDEF */
/* vi: aw ai sw=2
*/
/* End of acl.c */
